{
 "name": "Remediation vs Mitigation: Decision Table",
 "edition": "2026-11-19",
 "license": "CC BY 4.0",
 "license_url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/",
 "cite": "Remediation vs Mitigation, Decision Table, edition 19 Nov 2026, https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/",
 "legend": {
  "remediate": "eliminate the vulnerability (patch, upgrade, remove or decommission)",
  "mitigate_now_fix_later": "reduce exposure or impact now with a control, then fix on a set date",
  "accept_with_dated_exception": "accept the residual risk in a signed, dated, reviewed exception",
  "other:verify_then_close": "not one of the three responses"
 },
 "kev_catalog": {
  "catalogVersion": "2026.11.18",
  "dateReleased": "2026-11-18T19:17:41.0354Z",
  "count": 1786,
  "read": "2026-11-19",
  "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json",
  "distinct_requiredAction_strings": 44,
  "required_action_counts": {
   "apply_updates_exact": 893,
   "mitigations_or_discontinue_exact": 260,
   "mitigations_bod2201_cloud_or_discontinue_exact": 323,
   "mitigations_bod2604_forensics_exact": 169,
   "containing_mitigations_any_wording": 791,
   "containing_discontinue_any_wording": 815,
   "containing_apply_updates_any_wording": 917,
   "containing_end_of_life_any_wording": 83
  },
  "note": "Counts computed from the feed read on 2026-11-19. 'Any wording' counts overlap; an entry can contain both mitigations and discontinue."
 },
 "decision_tool_rules": [
  {
   "rule": 1,
   "when": {
    "fix": "no"
   },
   "row": "kev-no-patch-yet",
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later"
  },
  {
   "rule": 2,
   "when": {
    "fix": "yes",
    "win": "yes",
    "kev": "yes"
   },
   "row": "kev-patch-available-exposed",
   "guidance_points_to": "remediate"
  },
  {
   "rule": 3,
   "when": {
    "fix": "yes",
    "win": "yes",
    "kev": "no",
    "net": "no"
   },
   "row": "internal-asset-not-kev-moderate",
   "guidance_points_to": "remediate"
  },
  {
   "rule": 4,
   "when": {
    "fix": "yes",
    "win": "yes",
    "kev": "no",
    "net": "yes"
   },
   "row": "kev-patch-available-exposed",
   "guidance_points_to": "remediate"
  },
  {
   "rule": 5,
   "when": {
    "fix": "yes",
    "win": "no",
    "ctl": "yes"
   },
   "row": "compensating-control-in-front",
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later"
  },
  {
   "rule": 6,
   "when": {
    "fix": "yes",
    "win": "no",
    "kev": "no",
    "net": "no"
   },
   "row": "not-reachable-low-risk",
   "guidance_points_to": "accept_with_dated_exception"
  },
  {
   "rule": 7,
   "when": {
    "fix": "yes",
    "win": "no"
   },
   "row": "patch-breaks-critical-system",
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later"
  }
 ],
 "not_sure_reads_as": {
  "fix": "no",
  "net": "yes",
  "kev": "yes",
  "win": "no",
  "ctl": "no"
 },
 "questions": [
  {
   "id": "fix",
   "text": "Does a vendor fix exist today?"
  },
  {
   "id": "net",
   "text": "Is the vulnerable component reachable from the internet?"
  },
  {
   "id": "kev",
   "text": "Is the CVE on the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog?"
  },
  {
   "id": "win",
   "text": "Can the fix go in before its due date without breaking a critical system?"
  },
  {
   "id": "ctl",
   "text": "Is a control already in front of the flaw, and has someone tested it?"
  }
 ],
 "unread": [
  "PCI DSS v4.0.1 PDF incl. Appendix B and C and customized approach (click-through license, not accepted)",
  "ISO/IEC 27005 public pages (iso.org HTTP 403)",
  "FDA medical device cybersecurity guidance (fda.gov URLs tried returned not found)",
  "Microsoft Security Update Guide current definitions (script-built page, no text)"
 ],
 "rows": [
  {
   "id": "kev-patch-available-exposed",
   "situation": "A patch exists, the vulnerability is on the CISA KEV catalog, and the asset is reachable from the internet",
   "signals": [
    "Publicly exposed: yes",
    "In the KEV: yes",
    "A vendor update exists"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "remediate",
   "also_allowed": [
    "mitigate_now_fix_later"
   ],
   "summary": "Federal civilian agencies must remediate within 3 days (14 days if exploitation is not automatable and control is only partial). CISA urges every other organization to prioritize remediation of KEV entries. Mitigation alone, such as removing the system from the internet, changes the timeline but is not the end state.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "Row 1 of Table 1 in BOD 26-04: publicly exposed, in the KEV, automatable by an adversary, total control: remediate in 3 calendar days and carry out forensic triage. Rows 2, 3 and 4 (exposed and in the KEV) are 3 days, 3 days with forensic triage, and 14 days.",
     "quote": "Yes | Yes | Yes | Total control | 3 days & forensic triage",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Table 1: Remediation Timelines (BOD 26-04, read from the published table image)"
    },
    {
     "claim": "CISA's advice to organizations that are not bound by the directive.",
     "quote": "CISA strongly recommends all organizations review and monitor the KEV catalog and prioritize remediation of the listed vulnerabilities",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary"
    },
    {
     "claim": "BOD 26-04 defines remediation as eliminating the vulnerability, which can include decommissioning.",
     "quote": "the vulnerability shall be remediated (that is, the vulnerability is eliminated through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action)",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Appendix A, notes to Table 1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "FedRAMP 2026 rule VDR-TFR-KEV: remediate KEVs on the CISA due date even when fully mitigated.",
     "quote": "Providers SHOULD remediate Known Exploited Vulnerabilities according to the due dates in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (even if the vulnerability has been fully mitigated)",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "VDR-TFR-KEV"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-patch-available-exposed/"
  },
  {
   "id": "kev-no-patch-yet",
   "situation": "The vulnerability is exploited or severe and the vendor has not released a patch yet",
   "signals": [
    "A patch may not be available yet",
    "Mitigation instructions exist from the vendor"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later",
   "also_allowed": [
    "accept_with_dated_exception"
   ],
   "summary": "NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 names emergency mitigation for this case and says to replace it with the permanent fix and remove the mitigation on a schedule. In the KEV feed, 791 of 1786 required actions mention mitigations, most often as 'apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable'.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "SP 800-40r4 defines emergency mitigation as a temporary measure before a patch exists.",
     "quote": "Emergency mitigation. This is the emergency procedure in a crisis situation, like those described above for the emergency patching scenario, to temporarily mitigate vulnerabilities before a patch is available.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 3.4 maintenance scenarios, PDF page 20"
    },
    {
     "claim": "The mitigation is meant to end: both dates are set and enforced.",
     "quote": "Once a permanent fix, such as a patch, is available, the patch will need to be deployed and the mitigation removed. Schedules should be set and enforced for both patch deployment and mitigation removal.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 3.5.3"
    },
    {
     "claim": "SP 800-40r4 lists a missing patch as a reason patching is not immediately viable.",
     "quote": "A patch may not be available yet.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 2.1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "KEV feed requiredAction text: the most common mitigation-or-discontinue wording, counted from the live feed.",
     "quote": "Apply mitigations per vendor instructions or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "requiredAction field, catalog version 2026.11.18: 260 entries with this exact text"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-no-patch-yet/"
  },
  {
   "id": "patch-breaks-critical-system",
   "situation": "A patch is available but it would disrupt or has broken a business-critical system",
   "signals": [
    "Testing shows regression",
    "An outage window is not available yet"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later",
   "also_allowed": [
    "accept_with_dated_exception"
   ],
   "summary": "Guidance accepts delay for testing and outage windows and expects an interim control plus a dated plan. NIST names a flawed or disruptive patch as a reason for emergency mitigation. For KEV entries on federal systems, CISA says it grants no waivers and the fallback is to remove the asset from the network.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "SP 800-40r4 accepts testing and outage windows as reasons not to patch immediately.",
     "quote": "The organization may need to wait for a scheduled outage window, perform testing first, update other software that interacts with the software to be patched, or train employees on new features or interfaces.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 2.1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "A problematic patch is a stated reason for emergency mitigation.",
     "quote": "Emergency mitigations are sometimes needed because of issues with a patch.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 3.4"
    },
    {
     "claim": "SI-2 requires testing for side effects before installation.",
     "quote": "Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation for effectiveness and potential side effects before installation;",
     "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_2_0/home",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "SI-2 b"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Federal KEV deadlines have no waiver path.",
     "quote": "CISA does not issue waivers or exceptions for actions required in cyber directives.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Implementation guidance FAQ"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/patch-breaks-critical-system/"
  },
  {
   "id": "end-of-life-software",
   "situation": "The product or version is end of life or end of support, so no patch will ever ship",
   "signals": [
    "Vendor has ended support",
    "No updates exist"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "remediate",
   "also_allowed": [
    "mitigate_now_fix_later",
    "accept_with_dated_exception"
   ],
   "summary": "The fix is removal or replacement. Where that cannot happen yet, the sources describe isolation and a documented exception. In the KEV feed, 83 required actions use end-of-life wording.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "SP 800-40r4 on end of life.",
     "quote": "The vendor may no longer support the vulnerable software, meaning that a patch for it will never be released because the software is at end-of-life.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 2.1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "BOD 26-02 sets decommissioning as the end state for end-of-support edge devices (federal civilian agencies, 18 months from 5 Feb 2026).",
     "quote": "Decommission all identified EOS edge devices from agency networks, replacing devices as needed with vendor-supported devices that can receive current security updates.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-02-mitigating-risk-end-support-edge-devices",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Required Actions"
    },
    {
     "claim": "A KEV required action for end-of-life products.",
     "quote": "The impacted product is end-of-life and should be disconnected if still in use.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "requiredAction field, 52 entries with this exact text"
    },
    {
     "claim": "SA-22 names the exception to replacement.",
     "quote": "Exceptions to replacing unsupported system components include systems that provide critical mission or business capabilities where newer technologies are not available or where the systems are so isolated that installing replacement components is not an option.",
     "source": "https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_2_0/home",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "SA-22 discussion"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/end-of-life-software/"
  },
  {
   "id": "not-reachable-low-risk",
   "situation": "The vulnerable component is not internet-reachable, not on the KEV list, and an adversary cannot automate exploitation",
   "signals": [
    "Publicly exposed: no",
    "In the KEV: no",
    "Automatable: no"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "accept_with_dated_exception",
   "also_allowed": [
    "mitigate_now_fix_later"
   ],
   "summary": "BOD 26-04 Table 1 sets 'Fix on system upgrade' for rows 15 and 16 (not exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable): the fix waits for the next scheduled major upgrade or rebuild, and the timeline restarts if conditions change.",
   "caveat": "Only BOD 26-04 and FedRAMP set this as a rule for federal systems. Other organizations set their own dates under NIST SP 800-39 and 800-53 RA-7.",
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "Row 15 of Table 1: not exposed, not in the KEV, not automatable, total control.",
     "quote": "No | No | No | Total control | Fix on system upgrade",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Table 1: Remediation Timelines (BOD 26-04, read from the published table image)"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Defines the deferred outcome.",
     "quote": "Fix on system upgrade means that, unless conditions change as described in item (e) above, the vulnerability should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Appendix A, notes to Table 1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "NIST SP 800-39 on when acceptance fits.",
     "quote": "Risk acceptance is the appropriate risk response when the identified risk is within the organizational risk tolerance.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-39.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Task 3-1, Chapter 3 page 42"
    },
    {
     "claim": "FedRAMP 2026 on evaluating exploitability before responding.",
     "quote": "The simple reality is that most traditional vulnerabilities discovered by scanners or during assessment are not likely to be exploitable",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-evaluation-and-reporting/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "VER-EVA-ELX notes"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/not-reachable-low-risk/"
  },
  {
   "id": "saas-cannot-patch",
   "situation": "The affected product is third-party SaaS or a managed service whose code you cannot patch",
   "signals": [
    "Vendor controls the fix",
    "Your lever is configuration, access or exposure"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later",
   "also_allowed": [
    "accept_with_dated_exception"
   ],
   "summary": "SP 800-40r4 lists SaaS as a form of transferring risk because the vendor patches. FedRAMP says the provider detects, mitigates and remediates, and an agency POA&M is only for actions the agency owns, tracks or accepts. The older FedRAMP playbook required high-risk vendor dependencies to be mitigated to Moderate within 30 days (legacy page, kept for reference only).",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "SP 800-40r4 on Transfer.",
     "quote": "replacing conventional software installations with software-as-a-service (SaaS) usage where the SaaS vendor/managed service provider takes care of patching.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 2.1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "FedRAMP 2026 split of duties.",
     "quote": "A FedRAMP Certified cloud service provider is responsible for detecting, evaluating, reporting, mitigating, and remediating vulnerabilities in its cloud service offering.",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/agencies/use/ongoing/poams/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Managing POA&Ms"
    },
    {
     "claim": "When the customer writes its own POA&M.",
     "quote": "Agencies should create Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) only when there are actions the agency needs to take, track, fund, manage, or accept for the agency information system that uses FedRAMP Certified cloud services.",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/agencies/use/ongoing/poams/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Managing POA&Ms"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Legacy FedRAMP rule for vendor dependencies (page marked as reference only after 24 Jun 2026).",
     "quote": "High-risk VDs must be mitigated to a Moderate level through compensating controls within thirty (30) days.",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "General POA&M Guidance"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/saas-cannot-patch/"
  },
  {
   "id": "compensating-control-in-front",
   "situation": "A control already sits in front of the vulnerable component (WAF rule, segmentation, access restriction)",
   "signals": [
    "Exploit path blocked at a choke point",
    "The vulnerable code or version is unchanged"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later",
   "also_allowed": [
    "accept_with_dated_exception"
   ],
   "summary": "Sources treat a working control as a valid response but not as the fix. NIST allows accepting risk by relying on existing controls. FedRAMP 2026 says a fully mitigated vulnerability still exists until remediated, and requires KEVs to be remediated by the due date anyway. OWASP says a virtual patch does not remove the underlying vulnerability.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "SP 800-40r4 on Accept.",
     "quote": "Accept the risk from vulnerable software as is, such as by relying on existing security controls to prevent vulnerability exploitation",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 2.1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "FedRAMP 2026 separates mitigation from remediation.",
     "quote": "A fully mitigated vulnerability will still exist (with negligible risk) until it has been remediated.",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "VDR-CSO-RES notes"
    },
    {
     "claim": "OWASP on virtual patching.",
     "quote": "It does not remove the underlying vulnerability.",
     "source": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Virtual_Patching_Cheat_Sheet.html",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Definition: Virtual Patching"
    },
    {
     "claim": "FedRAMP 2026: a deflecting control changes the exposure rating.",
     "quote": "once this prevention is in place the vulnerability should no longer be considered an internet-reachable vulnerability.",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-evaluation-and-reporting/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "VER-EVA-EIR notes"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/compensating-control-in-front/"
  },
  {
   "id": "decommission-scheduled",
   "situation": "The asset is scheduled to be retired on a known date",
   "signals": [
    "Decommission date is set",
    "Asset has no long-term role"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "accept_with_dated_exception",
   "also_allowed": [
    "mitigate_now_fix_later"
   ],
   "summary": "Retirement counts as a fix in BOD 26-04 and as 'Avoid' in SP 800-40r4. The sources imply an exception that ends on the decommission date, with interim mitigation for exposed assets. No source sets a standard exception length for this case.",
   "caveat": "Date of the exception is the organization's choice. A decommission date that keeps moving is the failure case the sources warn about.",
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "Decommissioning is remediation under BOD 26-04.",
     "quote": "the vulnerability shall be remediated (that is, the vulnerability is eliminated through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action)",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Appendix A"
    },
    {
     "claim": "SP 800-40r4 on Avoid.",
     "quote": "Avoid: Ensure that the risk does not occur by eliminating the attack surface, such as by uninstalling the vulnerable software, decommissioning assets with the vulnerabilities",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 2.1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Exceptions are reviewed on a schedule.",
     "quote": "All exceptions to maintenance plans should be reviewed regularly to determine if the maintenance plan can be implemented now.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 3.5.5"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/decommission-scheduled/"
  },
  {
   "id": "pci-cannot-meet-requirement",
   "situation": "A PCI DSS in-scope system cannot meet a requirement as written (for example a patch cannot be installed in time)",
   "signals": [
    "In-scope system",
    "Legitimate technical or business constraint"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later",
   "also_allowed": [],
   "summary": "PCI SSC says the QSA decides whether a compensating control meets the intent of a requirement, and that a compensating control cannot make up for a periodic task that was missed. For vulnerabilities, PCI SSC defines 'resolved' (fixed) and 'addressed' (fix, or reduce the risk another way such as a compensating control or disabling a service).",
   "caveat": "The text of PCI DSS v4.0.1 Appendix B (compensating controls) and Appendix C (worksheet) sits behind a click-through license on 19 Nov 2026 and was not read; only PCI SSC's public FAQs and blog were.",
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "Who judges a compensating control.",
     "quote": "QSAs are responsible to determine whether a compensating control is sufficient to meet the intent of a requirement during their review of all other controls in place to satisfy PCI DSS requirements.",
     "source": "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1046",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "PCI SSC FAQ 1046"
    },
    {
     "claim": "PCI SSC definition of 'addressed'.",
     "quote": "Addressed - the entity determines whether to resolve the vulnerability or to mitigate the risk by addressing the vulnerability in another way (e.g., with a compensating control or by disabling a vulnerable service).",
     "source": "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "PCI SSC FAQ 1597"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Why a missed periodic task cannot be covered after the fact.",
     "quote": "there is no way for them to perform the control retroactively or backdate a later occurrence of the control to an earlier period.",
     "source": "https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1572",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "PCI SSC FAQ 1572"
    },
    {
     "claim": "The 30 day patch rule applies to critical vulnerabilities (v4.0.1).",
     "quote": "Reverted to PCI DSS v3.2.1 language that installing patches/updates within 30 days applies only for \"critical vulnerabilities.\"",
     "source": "https://blog.pcisecuritystandards.org/just-published-pci-dss-v4-0-1",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Requirement 6 changes"
    }
   ],
   "page": null
  },
  {
   "id": "ot-medical-cannot-patch",
   "situation": "A medical or OT/ICS device cannot be patched on the usual cycle (manufacturer approval, safety certification, uptime)",
   "signals": [
    "Vendor-controlled update schedule",
    "Safety or availability impact"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later",
   "also_allowed": [
    "accept_with_dated_exception"
   ],
   "summary": "SP 800-40r4 expects an approved set of long-term mitigations, reviewed in advance by security architects, and periodic re-evaluation. CISA's ICS advisories tell users to take defensive measures, minimize network exposure, and run impact analysis before deploying them.",
   "caveat": "FDA premarket and postmarket device cybersecurity guidance could not be read on 19 Nov 2026 (the fda.gov pages tried returned not found), so no FDA text is quoted.",
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "Why some assets cannot follow the normal patch cycle.",
     "quote": "The manufacturer may require customers to update the software on a delayed schedule, such as for assets with human safety implications in a highly regulated sector, because of the extensive testing and certification that must be performed first.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 2.1"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Unpatchable assets are re-evaluated, not parked.",
     "quote": "Organizations should plan on periodically reevaluating their alternatives to patching.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Section 3.5.4"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Standard wording in CISA ICS advisories (example: ICSA-26-321-11).",
     "quote": "CISA recommends users take defensive measures to minimize the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-321-11",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Recommended Practices"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Mitigation also carries operational risk in ICS.",
     "quote": "CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-321-11",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Recommended Practices"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/ot-medical-cannot-patch/"
  },
  {
   "id": "kev-due-date-cannot-be-met",
   "situation": "A federal civilian agency cannot meet a KEV remediation date",
   "signals": [
    "Federal civilian executive branch",
    "Asset cannot be updated in time"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "mitigate_now_fix_later",
   "also_allowed": [],
   "summary": "CISA says it does not issue waivers or exceptions, and that the only technical mitigation besides the catalog's required action is to remove the asset from the network (decommissioning, segmentation, isolation, software-defined perimeters, proxies). Agencies are told to contact CISA about special cases.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "CISA implementation guidance FAQ.",
     "quote": "Aside from removing affected assets from the network, the only known technical mitigation to vulnerabilities in the KEV Catalog is to apply the required actions listed in the catalog.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Implementation guidance FAQ"
    },
    {
     "claim": "No waiver path.",
     "quote": "CISA does not issue waivers or exceptions for actions required in cyber directives.",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Implementation guidance FAQ"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Exposure removal changes the clock.",
     "quote": "one valid mitigation is to remove the system from the internet; that action changes the value of \"Publicly Exposed\" from Yes to No and will shift the required timeline for further action",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Appendix A, notes to Table 1"
    }
   ],
   "page": null
  },
  {
   "id": "internal-asset-not-kev-moderate",
   "situation": "A patch exists, the asset is not exposed to the internet, the vulnerability is not on the KEV list, and exploitation is automatable",
   "signals": [
    "Publicly exposed: no",
    "In the KEV: no",
    "Automatable: yes"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "remediate",
   "also_allowed": [
    "accept_with_dated_exception"
   ],
   "summary": "BOD 26-04 Table 1 rows 13 and 14 give 60 days; rows 15 and 16 give 'fix on system upgrade' when exploitation is also not automatable. SP 800-39 says lower-priority risks may be addressed later rather than ignored.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "Row 13 of Table 1: not exposed, not in the KEV, automatable, total control.",
     "quote": "No | No | Yes | Total control | 60 days",
     "source": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Table 1: Remediation Timelines (BOD 26-04, read from the published table image)"
    },
    {
     "claim": "Lower priority means later, not never.",
     "quote": "This does not necessarily mean that the lower-priority risks would not be addressed. Rather, it could mean that fewer resources might be directed at the lower-priority risks (at least initially), or that the lower-priority risks would be addressed at a later time.",
     "source": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-39.pdf",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "Task 3-3, Chapter 3"
    }
   ],
   "page": "https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/internal-asset-not-kev-moderate/"
  },
  {
   "id": "false-positive",
   "situation": "The scanner reports a vulnerability that does not exist on the system",
   "signals": [
    "Evidence the condition is absent"
   ],
   "guidance_points_to": "other:verify_then_close",
   "also_allowed": [],
   "summary": "None of the three responses applies: the sources say to verify and record the false positive. The older FedRAMP playbook treats a validated false positive as closed and a non-validated one as pending approval; the 2026 rules say providers should evaluate whether a detection is a false positive.",
   "caveat": null,
   "sources": [
    {
     "claim": "Legacy FedRAMP definition.",
     "quote": "A false positive (FP) occurs when a vulnerability is identified that does not actually exist on the system.",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "General POA&M Guidance"
    },
    {
     "claim": "FedRAMP 2026 rule VER-EVA-EFP.",
     "quote": "Providers SHOULD evaluate detected vulnerabilities, considering the context of the cloud service offering, to determine if they are false positive vulnerabilities.",
     "source": "https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-evaluation-and-reporting/",
     "read": "2026-11-19",
     "kind": "primary",
     "location": "VER-EVA-EFP"
    }
   ],
   "page": null
  }
 ]
}