# The asset is scheduled to be retired on a known date

Canonical: https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/decommission-scheduled/

Accept with a dated exception that expires on the decommission date, and add an interim control if the asset is reachable. BOD 26-04 counts decommissioning as remediation only once the asset is gone, so a federal KEV due date that falls first still binds. In the worked case below the gap is 8 days.

Guidance points to: Accept with a dated exception. Also allowed: Mitigate now, fix later.

Signals: Decommission date is set; Asset has no long-term role.

## The situation

The asset has a retirement date in a project plan or change ticket, and a vulnerability is found on it before that date. The asset has no long-term role. The row does not cover software that is past support with no retirement date; that is [end-of-life software](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/end-of-life-software/).

## The decision and its conditions

Accept with a dated exception that ends on the decommission date. Mitigate now, fix later is also allowed and is the better choice if the asset is reachable from outside. The exception holds only while four conditions hold:

1. The date sits in an approved plan with a named owner, not in a hope.
2. An interim control is in place if the asset is reachable from the internet. For an unexposed asset, write down the basis for saying so.
3. The fix being skipped costs more than the exposure it leaves for the days that remain.
4. No shorter date binds you, such as a KEV due date on a federal system.

## The rules it follows

Two sources agree that taking the asset away resolves the flaw. BOD 26-04: "the vulnerability shall be remediated (that is, the vulnerability is eliminated through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action)". NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 lists Avoid among its four responses: "Ensure that the risk does not occur by eliminating the attack surface, such as by uninstalling the vulnerable software, decommissioning assets with the vulnerabilities". Both mean the asset is gone. Until then the finding is open and the exception covers the gap.

No rule sets a length for this exception, so the date is the length. NIST asks for tracking: "Organizations should closely track and monitor all exceptions to maintenance plans." and "All exceptions to maintenance plans should be reviewed regularly to determine if the maintenance plan can be implemented now." It also names the last step of avoidance: verify "that vulnerable assets were decommissioned or replaced" and check that no one "restarts the decommissioned asset".

## Worked case: CVE-2026-85880 on a file server

A heap overflow in Windows ALPC lets code that already runs as a low-privileged local user inside an AppContainer escape the sandbox and reach SYSTEM (CVSS 3.1 base score 7.8, vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:L). Microsoft marked it exploited on the day it shipped the fix. The affected asset is an internal Server 2016 file server that the change ticket retires on 30 Sep 2026.

CVE-2026-85880, Windows Advanced Local Procedure Call, on an internal Server 2016 file server. Read 19 Nov 2026.

| Date | Event | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| 8 Sep 2026 | Microsoft publishes the fix (for Server 2016, KB5123099) and marks the flaw exploited. CISA adds the CVE to the KEV catalog the same day | Microsoft advisory; CISA KEV feed |
| 22 Sep 2026 | KEV due date, 14 days after listing: BOD 26-04 Table 1 row 11 (not publicly exposed, in the KEV, not automatable, total control). The feed's own due date is the same | CISA KEV feed; Table 1, counted |
| 30 Sep 2026 | Decommission date on the change ticket, 22 days after listing and 8 days after the due date | Case assumption |
| 15 Nov 2026 | Date the project slips to, 68 days after listing | Case assumption |

A federal agency has no exception to write. The due date of 22 Sep comes 8 days before the retirement, CISA issues no waivers, and its guidance gives one fallback: if the action cannot be done in time, "remove the asset from the agency network". The choices are KB5123099 and a restart before 22 Sep, or taking the server off the network by then.

Any other organization may write the exception, 8 Sep to 30 Sep, if its policy allows it. Microsoft lists no workaround. The interim control is to limit who can sign in to the server, which lowers the chance that attacker code runs on the host at all; the cost is that users lose interactive access. Against that stands the cost of the fix, which is one cumulative update and one restart. For a file server that cost is often less than the exception's paperwork and its interim control, and the usual answer, accept until retirement, is the weaker choice. If the project slips to 15 Nov, the exception still ends on 30 Sep. Running the server to the new date is a new request, with the patch as its default.

## What to record

**Exception: scheduled decommission**

- Tracking ID and finding reference (CVE ID, scanner finding ID):
- Asset, environment, exposure (internet-facing or internal):
- Reason the asset is not patched: scheduled for retirement
- Decommission date, and the project or change ticket that carries it:
- Cost and downtime of the fix that is being skipped:
- Interim control while the asset runs (or: asset not reachable, and the basis):
- Expiry of this exception: the decommission date
- Number of times the date has moved (allowed: 0 or 1):
- Approver, title, date:
- Person who will confirm removal, and the date:
- Reopen if: the date moves a second time, the asset becomes internet-exposed, the CVE is added to the KEV catalog
- Closed on: the date the asset was confirmed gone from the network and the inventory

The last two lines carry the control: an expiry on the decommission date, and a named person who confirms removal. Fields not listed here are on the [risk acceptance form](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/) and the [exception register](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/exception-register/). What happens when a date passes is covered in [risk exception expiry](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/exception-expiry-and-renewal/).

## When the usual answer is wrong

- **A federal KEV due date falls before retirement.** BOD 26-04 allows no exception. Patch, or remove the asset from the network, before the due date.
- **The asset is reachable from the internet.** Exposure moves a KEV entry to a shorter row: the same flaw on an exposed asset would be row 3 or 4, with 3 or 14 days. The directive says the timelines "are dynamic as facts change", and a retirement planned for next quarter does not pause them. Put the interim control in before the exception. For an unexposed asset that is not in the KEV, the slower row applies, such as the 60 days of the [internal row](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/internal-asset-not-kev-moderate/); this case is a KEV entry, so row 11 and its 14 days apply.
- **The date has already moved once.** A second move ends the exception and sends the finding back to its normal response. The one-move limit is a rule to write into your own policy; no standard sets it.
- **The asset is powered off but still on the network or in the inventory.** Retirement counts only when the asset is confirmed gone.
- **A listing on the KEV catalog, a change in exposure or a vendor mitigation the asset can take.** Each of these reopens the entry.

## Sources

- CISA, BOD 26-04, Appendix A, notes to Table 1: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, alternative mitigation and waiver FAQs: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Sections 2.1, 3.3 and 3.5.5: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, KEV JSON feed, catalog 2026.11.18, entry CVE-2026-85880: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Microsoft Security Response Center, September 2026 CVRF, CVE-2026-85880: https://api.msrc.microsoft.com/cvrf/v3.0/cvrf/2026-Sep (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

## Related

- [Decision Table: Remediate, Mitigate or Accept by Situation](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/index.md)
- [Risk Acceptance Form: Free Template With 15 Fields](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/index.md)
- [Exception Register: 15 Columns, States and Blank CSV](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/exception-register/index.md)
- [Maximum Duration of a Risk Acceptance: 9 Sources](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/maximum-durations/index.md)
- [Accepting Risk on End-of-Life Software: Limits and Record](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/accepting-risk-on-end-of-life-software/index.md)
- [Risk Exception Expiry: What Happens and How to Renew](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/exception-expiry-and-renewal/index.md)
- [End-of-Life Software: Replace, Isolate or Accept With Dates](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/end-of-life-software/index.md)
