# Remediate, mitigate or accept: the Decision Table

Canonical: https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/

Thirteen situations, each with the decision, the deadline, who signs and the record to keep (read 19 Nov 2026). Published guidance points to remediation in 3, mitigation now with a dated fix in 7, a dated exception in 2 and verify-then-close in 1. CISA BOD 26-04 grants federal agencies no waiver.

## The 13 situations

**Decision** is the response the cited text points to most directly. It is not an order of preference. **Deadline** is a date or interval a source sets, and the cell says so where none does. **Who signs** names the role a source gives. Each linked situation page quotes the rule, works one real CVE through it and says when the usual answer is wrong. The sources for each linked row are named on its page.

Decision Table, 13 situations. Sources: CISA BOD 26-04 and its implementation guidance, CISA BOD 26-02, FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026, PCI SSC FAQs 1046 and 1597, NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 and SP 800-37 Rev. 2. Read 19 Nov 2026.

| Situation | Decision | Deadline | Who signs | Record to keep |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| [A patch exists, the flaw is on the KEV catalog and the asset is internet-reachable](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-patch-available-exposed/) | Remediate | Federal: 3 days from the KEV listing or the agency's own detection, whichever comes first; 14 days where exploitation is not automatable and control is partial. Forensic triage rides with the 3-day rows for total control | No one for a federal agency: CISA issues no waivers. Elsewhere, the risk owner | Clock start, fix date, forensic triage report |
| [Exploited or severe, and the vendor has no patch yet](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-no-patch-yet/) | Mitigate now, fix later | Mitigation at once. NIST: set and enforce schedules for patch deployment and for mitigation removal. A KEV entry keeps its due date | The risk owner. On a federal system the authorizing official accepts what remains | Mitigation, its removal date, planned patch date |
| [A patch would break a critical system](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/patch-breaks-critical-system/) | Mitigate now, fix later | The next outage window after testing. On a federal KEV entry the due date stands | The risk owner for the delay. No one for a federal KEV entry | Regression result, outage window, interim control |
| [The software is end of life](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/end-of-life-software/) | Remediate (replace or remove) | Federal edge devices under BOD 26-02 (issued 5 Feb 2026): identified end-of-support devices decommissioned within 18 months, by 5 Aug 2027. Elsewhere, the replacement date you set | The authorizing official or risk owner, for any SA-22 exception | Replacement date, isolation evidence, SA-22 reason |
| [Not reachable, not on the KEV catalog, not automatable](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/not-reachable-low-risk/) | Accept with a dated exception | Fix on system upgrade: the next scheduled major upgrade or rebuild. The timeline restarts when exposure, KEV status or automation changes | The risk owner, within stated tolerance. In BOD 26-04 scope the timeline is the rule | Exposure basis, the upgrade, the conditions that reopen it |
| [SaaS or a managed service you cannot patch](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/saas-cannot-patch/) | Mitigate now, fix later | The provider's fix. FedRAMP providers must categorize a flaw not mitigated or remediated within 192 days of evaluation as accepted | The provider records it. The agency authorizing official signs any agency POA&M | Provider notice, your configuration changes, provider status date |
| [A control already sits in front](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/compensating-control-in-front/) | Mitigate now, fix later | A fix date written the day the control goes in. A KEV due date still stands; FedRAMP's 192 days is the outer limit | The risk owner. In PCI DSS the QSA judges the control | Control, test date, exposure value, fix date |
| [The asset is scheduled to be retired](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/decommission-scheduled/) | Accept with a dated exception | The decommission date, no later. On a federal KEV entry the due date stands | The risk owner. The authorizing official on a federal system | Decommission date, interim control, confirmation of removal |
| A PCI DSS system cannot meet a requirement | Mitigate now, fix later | Critical patches within one month of release (Requirement 6.3.3, PCI SSC FAQ 1597) | The QSA judges a compensating control. PCI SSC does not approve one | Assessor's finding, corrective actions, targeted risk analysis |
| [A medical or OT device cannot be patched on cycle](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/ot-medical-cannot-patch/) | Mitigate now, fix later | None set. NIST: reevaluate the alternatives to patching periodically | Security architects review the long-term mitigations in advance. The risk owner accepts what remains | Approved long-term methods, re-evaluation date, impact analysis |
| A federal agency cannot meet a KEV date | Mitigate: remove the asset from the network | The due date stands. Removing exposure moves the asset to another Table 1 row | No one: CISA issues no waivers. Agencies contact CISA about special cases | Removal from the network, contact with CISA, new clock |
| [Internal asset, patch exists, not on the KEV catalog, automatable](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/internal-asset-not-kev-moderate/) | Remediate | 60 days (Table 1 rows 13 and 14) | No one for a federal agency. Elsewhere, the risk owner | Clock start, 60-day fix date, reason for any exception |
| [The scanner reports a flaw that is not there](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/false-positive-handling/) | Verify, then close | None set | No risk is accepted. FedRAMP's legacy playbook holds a false positive that is not validated as pending approval | Evidence of absence, validator, closing date |

## Federal deadlines in BOD 26-04 Table 1

Most deadline cells above come from this table. CISA publishes it as an image; the rows below are transcribed from that image. Days are calendar days. In the directive's words, "The timelines for each asset are dynamic as facts change": removing a system from the internet changes "Publicly Exposed" from Yes to No and moves the asset to another row, while a new KEV listing shortens the timeline. The clock starts when CISA adds the flaw to the KEV catalog or the agency identifies it on an asset, whichever comes first.

BOD 26-04 Table 1, Remediation Timelines, transcribed 19 Nov 2026. Totals: 5 rows at 3 days (3 of them with forensic triage), 6 at 14 days, 3 at 60 days, 2 at fix on system upgrade.

| Row | Publicly exposed | In the KEV | Automatable by adversary | Technical impact | Agency timeline |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Total | 3 days and forensic triage |
| 2 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial | 3 days |
| 3 | Yes | Yes | No | Total | 3 days and forensic triage |
| 4 | Yes | Yes | No | Partial | 14 days |
| 5 | Yes | No | Yes | Total | 3 days |
| 6 | Yes | No | Yes | Partial | 14 days |
| 7 | Yes | No | No | Total | 14 days |
| 8 | Yes | No | No | Partial | 60 days |
| 9 | No | Yes | Yes | Total | 3 days and forensic triage |
| 10 | No | Yes | Yes | Partial | 14 days |
| 11 | No | Yes | No | Total | 14 days |
| 12 | No | Yes | No | Partial | 14 days |
| 13 | No | No | Yes | Total | 60 days |
| 14 | No | No | Yes | Partial | 60 days |
| 15 | No | No | No | Total | Fix on system upgrade |
| 16 | No | No | No | Partial | Fix on system upgrade |

The directive defines remediation as eliminating the vulnerability "through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action". "Fix on system upgrade" means remediation "the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild". These two definitions are why the table treats retirement as a fix and a compensating control as a step.

## Who signs depends on the rule that binds you

For a federal system under NIST's risk management framework, "The explicit acceptance of risk is the responsibility of the authorizing official and cannot be delegated to other officials within the organization." ([SP 800-37 Rev. 2](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-37r2.pdf), Task R-4). For BOD 26-04 deadlines nobody signs: "CISA does not issue waivers or exceptions for actions required in cyber directives." ([implementation guidance](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk)). In PCI DSS the entity proposes a compensating control and the assessor judges it: PCI SSC "is not able to approve specific configurations or compensating controls" ([FAQ 1046](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1046)). Everyone else decides inside its own tolerance: NIST SP 800-39 says organizations "determine acceptable degrees of residual risk based on organizational risk tolerance and the specific risk tolerances of particular decision makers". Titles for that last case are on the [who may sign page](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/who-may-sign/).

## KEV due dates since BOD 26-04

In catalog 2026.11.18 (1,786 entries), 169 entries were added on or after 10 Jun 2026, the date of BOD 26-04. For 131 of them the due date is 3 days after the add date and for 38 it is 14 days. None is at 60 days. The feed marks 108 of the 169 for forensic triage and 61 not. Counted from the CISA feed on 19 Nov 2026. How the older required-action wording splits is on the [KEV required actions guide](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/kev-required-actions-mitigate-or-discontinue/).

## What the table does not decide

Only federal civilian agencies are bound by BOD 26-04. For everyone else CISA "strongly recommends all organizations review and monitor the KEV catalog and prioritize remediation of the listed vulnerabilities". FedRAMP's 2026 rules go further for cloud providers: "A fully mitigated vulnerability will still exist (with negligible risk) until it has been remediated." That is why mitigation is a step in most rows and the end state in none. Where a row ends in an exception, the [risk acceptance form](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/) and the [exception register](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/exception-register/) hold the fields and the [maximum durations page](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/maximum-durations/) lists every limit found. The definitions behind the labels are in [remediation versus mitigation](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/difference-between-remediation-and-mitigation/). The table is also available as [CSV](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table.csv) and [JSON](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table.json).

## Sources

- CISA, BOD 26-04, Table 1 and Appendix A: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, FAQ: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-02, Required Actions: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-02-mitigating-risk-end-support-edge-devices (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, KEV JSON feed, catalog 2026.11.18: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog: https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP, Vulnerability Detection and Response rules 2026, VDR-CSO-RES: https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP, Vulnerability Evaluation and Reporting rules 2026, VER-TFR-MAV: https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-evaluation-and-reporting/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Sections 2.1, 3.5.3 and 3.5.4: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, Task R-4: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-37r2.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-39, Task 3-3: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-39.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)
- PCI SSC, FAQ 1046: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1046 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- PCI SSC, FAQ 1597: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597 (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

## Related

- [Risk Acceptance Form: Free Template With 15 Fields](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/index.md)
- [Exception Register: 15 Columns, States and Blank CSV](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/exception-register/index.md)
- [Difference Between Remediation and Mitigation in IT Security](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/difference-between-remediation-and-mitigation/index.md)
- [Who Can Accept Risk: Signer by Standard (2026)](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/who-may-sign/index.md)
- [Vulnerability False Positive: Close It With Evidence](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/false-positive-handling/index.md)
