# Internal asset, patch available, not on the KEV, automatable

Canonical: https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/internal-asset-not-kev-moderate/

Remediate within 60 days. BOD 26-04 Table 1 rows 13 and 14 give 60 calendar days to an unexposed asset when the CVE is not in the KEV catalog but an adversary can automate it. The clock shortens to 3 days the day CISA lists it: Langflow went from 18 Sep to 7 Aug 2026.

Guidance points to: Remediate. Also allowed: Accept with a dated exception.

Signals: Publicly exposed: no; In the KEV: no; Automatable: yes.

## The situation

The asset is not publicly exposed, the vendor has a fix, CISA has not listed the CVE in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's analysis says an adversary can automate every step. Under BOD 26-04 the inputs are asset exposure, catalog status, automatable by adversary and technical impact. CISA publishes the last three for every CVE through its Vulnrichment program; the agency answers exposure.

## The decision and why it is 60 days

The decision is remediate, with a longer clock than for exposed assets or listed flaws. Table 1 has three rows that give 60 days, and only two apply here:

BOD 26-04 Table 1, selected rows, read from the published table image on 19 Nov 2026.

| Row | Exposed | In the KEV | Automatable | Impact | Timeline | This page? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 8 | Yes | No | No | Partial | 60 days | No, exposed |
| 13 | No | No | Yes | Total | 60 days | Yes |
| 14 | No | No | Yes | Partial | 60 days | Yes |
| 15 and 16 | No | No | No | Total or partial | Fix on system upgrade | No, see [not reachable, low risk](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/not-reachable-low-risk/) |
| 9 | No | Yes | Yes | Total | 3 days & forensic triage | No, the CVE is listed |

Automation is what separates 60 days from "fix on system upgrade". NIST SP 800-39 gives the reasoning for a longer clock on lower-priority risk: "This does not necessarily mean that the lower-priority risks would not be addressed. Rather, it could mean that fewer resources might be directed at the lower-priority risks (at least initially), or that the lower-priority risks would be addressed at a later time." Later is not never, and an organization may set a shorter period of its own.

## The rule, quoted

- Remediation: "the vulnerability is eliminated through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action".
- Exposure: the directive counts an asset as public if it is "accessible to unauthenticated or untrusted entities via public networks, such as the internet, regardless of its physical or logical location". An instance with a public IP address in a cloud account is exposed, however internal its role.
- Clock start: the earlier of CISA adding the CVE to the catalog and the agency enumerating it on an asset in the CDM dashboard. The days are calendar days.
- Outside the directive: PCI SSC FAQ 1597 says critical patches "must be resolved within one month of release" and other patches follow the entity's risk assessment. FedRAMP's 2026 rules (launched 24 Jun 2026) tell providers to mark any vulnerability not fixed within 192 days of evaluation as an accepted vulnerability.

## Worked case: Langflow, CVE-2026-9198

Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 issues superuser tokens to any network caller when auto-login is on, and a code-validation endpoint then runs submitted Python, so an unauthenticated caller reaches remote code execution. Langflow 1.10.1 shipped on 23 Jun 2026, IBM's bulletin followed on 2 Jul, and NVD published the CVE on 17 Jul 2026, the day CISA's SSVC entry recorded automatable yes and impact total. An instance on a private network is row 13. CISA added the CVE to the catalog on 4 Aug 2026.

Dates from IBM's bulletin, Langflow's release notes, NVD and the KEV feed, catalog 2026.11.18, read 19 Nov 2026. The scanner finding on 20 Jul is assumed for illustration.

| Date | Event | Row and deadline |
|---|---|---|
| 23 Jun 2026 | Langflow 1.10.1 released with the fix | Not yet a CVE |
| 17 Jul 2026 | NVD publishes the CVE; CISA's SSVC data lists automatable yes, impact total | Row 13: 60 days if the clock starts here |
| 20 Jul 2026 | The agency's scanner finds an internal Langflow 1.9.x and updates the CDM dashboard (assumed date) | Clock starts. 60 days end 18 Sep 2026; midpoint 19 Aug |
| 4 Aug 2026 | CISA adds the CVE to the catalog, forensic triage required. Day 15 of 60 | Row 9: 3 days & forensic triage. Catalog due date 7 Aug 2026 |

A patch window planned for September fits the 60-day row and misses the new date by six weeks. CISA's guidance says to remediate "by the 'dueDate'" in the catalog, so 7 Aug 2026 is the date to meet. Counted from the 20 Jul start, the 3-day timeline would already have ended on 23 Jul; the directive does not say how a row change in mid-clock is counted, so take the catalog date and raise the earlier-start reading with CISA if it matters. The row changed because of CISA's action alone; nothing about the asset changed. Watching the catalog on the day it updates is part of owning a 60-day row.

Contrast a CVE that stays on the unlisted side: fastjson 1.2.68 to 1.2.83 (CVE-2026-16723) has CISA's SSVC entry of automatable no and impact total, and is not in the catalog. An unexposed deployment is row 15, fix on system upgrade, and the 1.2.84 release of 29 Jul 2026 can wait for the next rebuild. Automatable yes versus no is the whole difference between that and Langflow.

## When an exception is allowed

For federal systems under BOD 26-04 the exception route is closed: CISA grants no waivers or exceptions to directive actions, and nothing in the text carves out the 60-day rows. The fallback for a missed date is to remove the asset from the network.

Others may accept the risk. NIST SP 800-39 says "organizations may accept substantially greater risk (in the moderate/high range) due to compelling mission, business, or operational needs". The condition is the compelling need; a wish to avoid a reboot is not one. The exception names the CVE, a signer with the authority to accept it, the compensating step and an expiry date; see the [risk acceptance form](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/).

## What to record

- CVE ID, asset, and the evidence for each Table 1 input: exposure (how it was established), catalog status on the day, automatable and impact as CISA published them.
- The clock start and the source of that date (dashboard entry or catalog addition).
- The planned patch date inside the 60 days, the test that supports it, and who approves the change window.
- Review dates: the midpoint, day 60, and a catalog check at each review. If you set a shorter period than the table, write down that it is your own.
- The patched version and the date it was reached.

## When the usual answer is wrong

- The CVE joins the catalog. The row becomes 9 to 12 and the date comes from the catalog (Langflow above). See [patch available and exposed](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-patch-available-exposed/) for the 3-day rows.
- The asset is not as internal as recorded. A load balancer, a vendor tunnel or a public address makes it exposed; if any one method says so, the value is Yes and rows 5 to 8 apply.
- Automation changes. If CISA revises the entry to automatable no, the row moves to 15 or 16.
- Another path in. An internal attacker is anyone on the network, including a compromised workstation. Langflow's tokens went to any network caller, which shows why internal is not a safe label for an unauthenticated service.
- The patch cannot be applied. Go to [patch breaks a critical system](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/patch-breaks-critical-system/).

## Sources

- CISA, BOD 26-04, definitions, Table 1 and Appendix A notes: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, FAQ on waivers and due dates: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV JSON feed, catalog 2026.11.18, CVE-2026-9198 dateAdded and dueDate: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 19 Nov 2026)
- IBM security bulletin for Langflow OSS, CVE-2026-9198 (vendor advisory): https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278927 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Langflow, release notes for 1.10.1 (vendor): https://github.com/langflow-ai/langflow/releases/tag/v1.10.1 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-39, risk response and risk acceptance: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-39.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)
- PCI SSC, FAQ 1597: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP 2026 rules, VER-TFR-MAV: https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-evaluation-and-reporting/ (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

## Related

- [Decision Table: Remediate, Mitigate or Accept by Situation](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/index.md)
- [Not Exposed, Not on the KEV, Not Automatable: Accept](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/not-reachable-low-risk/index.md)
- [KEV Entry, Patch Out, Internet-Exposed: 3 or 14 Days](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-patch-available-exposed/index.md)
- [Maximum Duration of a Risk Acceptance: 9 Sources](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/maximum-durations/index.md)
