# Exploited flaw, no patch released yet

Canonical: https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-no-patch-yet/

Mitigate now and plan the fix. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 says to set and enforce two schedules, one for deploying the patch and one for removing the mitigation. FortiMail 7.2 shows the stakes: listed as exploited on 1 Oct 2026, its fix was still marked upcoming on 19 Nov 2026, 49 days later.

Guidance points to: Mitigate now, fix later. Also allowed: Accept with a dated exception.

Signals: A patch may not be available yet; Mitigation instructions exist from the vendor.

## The situation

The flaw is exploited or severe, the vendor has published a fix for some versions or for none, and your version has no fix yet. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Section 2.1, lists this among the reasons patching is not immediately viable: "A patch may not be available yet. For example, a vulnerability may be announced before a patch is ready, and it could be days, weeks, or months before the patch is released."

This page is for a fix that is coming. A product that will never be fixed belongs on [end-of-life software](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/end-of-life-software/), and the general options when no fix is planned are in mitigation when no patch exists.

## The decision and its conditions

The decision is mitigate now, fix later. It holds when all of these are true:

- The vendor, or a standard such as CISA's required action, names a mitigation you can apply: a feature turned off, access narrowed, or a rule in front of the service.
- You can say what the mitigation breaks and who accepts that.
- You can set a date by which the permanent fix replaces the mitigation, even if that date is a vendor check-in date and not a release date.

If no mitigation exists and the product cannot be stopped, the response is an exception recorded on the [risk acceptance form](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/), with the duration limits on the [maximum durations page](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/maximum-durations/).

## The rule, quoted

NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 defines the practice: "Emergency mitigation. This is the emergency procedure in a crisis situation, like those described above for the emergency patching scenario, to temporarily mitigate vulnerabilities before a patch is available." Section 3.5.3 adds the obligation: "Once a permanent fix, such as a patch, is available, the patch will need to be deployed and the mitigation removed. Schedules should be set and enforced for both patch deployment and mitigation removal." It also says: "Organizations should plan to replace emergency mitigations with permanent fixes."

For a federal civilian agency, the catalog entry's required action tells you what is acceptable. The text on entries added since the directive reads, in part: "Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA's BOD 26-04 ... or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable." CISA's implementation guidance adds that "the only known technical mitigation to vulnerabilities in the KEV Catalog is to apply the required actions listed in the catalog", so a vendor mitigation meets the directive and a homemade one does not. CISA issues no waivers. For a product embedded in another vendor's offering with no patch, the guidance says to "contact that vendor directly to obtain the patch or other operational guidance".

Legacy FedRAMP guidance (reference only after 24 Jun 2026) treated this as a vendor dependency: "CSPs are required to check in with the vendor at least once a month to determine the status of the patch/fix", with a date of last check-in recorded. Copying that cadence is a choice, not a current rule.

## Worked case: FortiMail, CVE-2026-104286

A path traversal in FortiMail lets an unauthenticated attacker write files on the appliance through crafted HTTP or HTTPS requests. Fortinet rates it 9.8 and, in advisory FG-IR-26-175, says it "has been reported to be exploited in the wild". CISA's SSVC entry gives automatable yes and technical impact total, so an exposed appliance is a Table 1 row 1 case.

Dates from Fortinet PSIRT FG-IR-26-175 and the KEV feed, catalog 2026.11.18, read 19 Nov 2026.

| Date | Event | What a defender with a FortiMail 7.2.9 appliance does |
|---|---|---|
| 1 Oct 2026 | Fortinet publishes the advisory with a workaround; CISA adds the CVE to the catalog the same day, due 4 Oct 2026 | Apply the workaround inside the 3 days. Start the triage record; the catalog entry marks forensic triage as required |
| 5 Oct 2026 | Advisory solution update; Fortinet fixes FortiMail Cloud itself (no customer action) | Cloud tenants close the record. Self-managed appliances stay open |
| 7 Oct 2026 | Last advisory revision: 8.0.2, 7.6.7 and 7.4.9 are fixed builds; the 7.2 train reads "Upgrade to upcoming 7.2.10 or above"; 7.0 reads "Migrate to a fixed release" | 8.0, 7.6 and 7.4 owners start the patch clock. The 7.2 owner keeps the mitigation and sets a check date |
| 19 Nov 2026 | The advisory page still reads "upcoming 7.2.10", updated date 7 Oct | The 7.2 appliance has run on the workaround for 49 days with the removal date unset |

The vendor's three mitigations differ in what they cost. Turning the IBE (identity-based encryption) service off stops secure-mail delivery through the portal, so recipients can no longer open or reply to IBE messages. Blocking the webmail interface from the internet removes access for external users, including IBE recipients. A web application firewall rule on POST requests to /ibe containing a parent-directory sequence must be written and tested by the owner. The choice of mitigation is a business decision and belongs in the record.

The 7.0 line has no fix to wait for: Fortinet says to migrate. That appliance has left this page and moved to [end-of-life software](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/end-of-life-software/).

## What to record

Mitigation record, exploited flaw with no patch for this version

CVE ID: CVE-2026-104286
Asset and version: FortiMail 7.2.9, mail gateway
Table 1 inputs: exposed yes, in the KEV yes, automatable yes, impact total
Clock start: 1 Oct 2026 (catalog addition) or the earlier identification date
Vendor source and date read: Fortinet FG-IR-26-175, revision of 7 Oct 2026, read 19 Nov 2026
Mitigation applied, date and by whom: IBE service off, 1 Oct 2026
What it breaks and who accepted that: IBE secure-mail recipients lose the portal; accepted by the mail service owner
Evidence the mitigation is in effect: configuration export showing IBE service off
Forensic triage: report reference and date; logs and configuration backup preserved before the change
Fix status check: next vendor check date, last check date, evidence of the check
Patch deployment date, set when the fix ships: ____
Mitigation removal date, set when the fix ships: ____
Close condition: patch applied and mitigation removed, both dated

Close the record only when both dates are filled. A mitigation with no removal date reads later as an unrecorded exception. No source sets a number of days for how long an emergency mitigation may stand, so the review rule is the earlier of the vendor's release and a date you fix when you apply it, with any extension tied to a signed exception.

## When the usual answer is wrong

- The mitigation closes one route, not the flaw. Fortinet's workaround stops the IBE path, and it does not undo a compromise from before 1 Oct. The workaround and the triage are separate tasks.
- The mitigation costs more than the exposure. If the workaround stops a service the business cannot lose, the choice becomes an exception with a signer who can accept that, not a quiet pass.
- The fix arrives for some trains only. Fortinet shipped three trains and left a fourth waiting; track each version line, not the product.
- The vendor's mitigation is a configuration change in a system you do not run. For SaaS, see [SaaS you cannot patch](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/saas-cannot-patch/).

## Sources

- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Sections 2.1, 3.3 and 3.5.3: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)
- Fortinet PSIRT, FG-IR-26-175 (vendor advisory): https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-175 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV JSON feed, catalog 2026.11.18, CVE-2026-104286 entry and requiredAction field: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, FAQ on alternative mitigations, vendors and waivers: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP legacy POA&M playbook, vendor dependency (reference only after 24 Jun 2026): https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NVD record for CVE-2026-104286, including CISA SSVC entry: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-104286 (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

## Related

- [Decision Table: Remediate, Mitigate or Accept by Situation](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/index.md)
- [Maximum Duration of a Risk Acceptance: 9 Sources](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/maximum-durations/index.md)
- [KEV Required Action: Mitigate or Discontinue Use](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/kev-required-actions-mitigate-or-discontinue/index.md)
- [End-of-Life Software: Replace, Isolate or Accept With Dates](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/end-of-life-software/index.md)
