# Patch available, on the KEV catalog, internet-exposed

Canonical: https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-patch-available-exposed/

Remediate. CISA BOD 26-04 (10 Jun 2026) gives a federal civilian agency 3 days, or 3 days plus forensic triage, for an exposed asset with a KEV entry and a patch; one of the four rows allows 14. The clock starts at the earlier of the catalog addition and the agency's own finding.

Guidance points to: Remediate. Also allowed: Mitigate now, fix later.

Signals: Publicly exposed: yes; In the KEV: yes; A vendor update exists.

## The situation

Three facts are true at once: a vendor update exists, CISA lists the CVE in the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, and the asset is publicly exposed. The directive defines the last term: "Any agency-owned or agency-managed IT resource accessible to unauthenticated or untrusted entities via public networks, such as the internet, regardless of its physical or logical location." A server in a private subnet that a load balancer, a NAT rule or a vendor tunnel makes reachable from the internet counts.

Where several tools disagree, the directive settles it: "If one such method finds that a system is publicly exposed, the value for the decision point should be set to Yes."

## The decision and what sets the number of days

The decision is remediate: the directive defines it as "the vulnerability is eliminated through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action". Table 1 holds four rows for an exposed asset on the catalog. Which one applies depends on two facts CISA publishes for each CVE through its Vulnrichment program: whether an adversary can automate every step, and whether exploitation gives total or partial control. The examples below are CVEs on this site whose catalog dates were read on 19 Nov 2026.

BOD 26-04 Table 1, rows 1 to 4 (publicly exposed: yes, in the KEV: yes), read from the published table image on 19 Nov 2026. Automatable and impact values for the examples are from CISA's SSVC entries in NVD; due dates are from the KEV feed, catalog 2026.11.18.

| Table 1 row | Automatable | Technical impact | Timeline | Example from the catalog | Added to catalog | Catalog due date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Yes | Total | 3 days & forensic triage | CVE-2026-97229, GitLab CE and EE | 29 Oct 2026 | 1 Nov 2026 |
| 2 | Yes | Partial | 3 days | CVE-2026-76418, Cisco ASA and FTD | 29 Oct 2026 | 1 Nov 2026 |
| 3 | No | Total | 3 days & forensic triage | CVE-2026-87491, Chromium V8 | 9 Sep 2026 | 23 Sep 2026 |
| 4 | No | Partial | 14 days | CVE-2026-41709, VMware ESX | 28 Oct 2026 | 11 Nov 2026 |

The V8 line shows how to read a due date. Row 3 would give 3 days, yet the catalog shows 14 (9 Sep to 23 Sep). CISA's guidance explains that it calculates the catalog date "using available data to determine whether there is evidence that the vulnerability is present in a publicly exposed asset", and that "the final determination for asset exposure is determined by the agency". CISA's 14 days matches row 11, an unexposed asset. If your V8 build sits on an exposed asset, row 3 applies to that asset, not the date in the feed.

## The rule, in the directive's words

- Clock start: "The timelines defined in Table 1 begin when either (1) CISA adds the vulnerability to the KEV Catalog, or (2) pursuant to BOD 23-01, the agency enumerates or identifies the vulnerability on an asset and updates the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program Agency and Federal Dashboard. Whichever event occurs first starts the remediation timeline."
- Triage: "The text '& forensic triage' means that the agency must complete remediation or mitigation action within the timeline (three days) and carry out a forensic triage of the asset to assess whether the system is compromised."
- Scope: the directive applies to federal civilian agency assets and, "unless directed by the governing procurement contract", not to contractors. CISA issues no waivers: "CISA does not issue waivers or exceptions for actions required in cyber directives."
- Cloud providers under FedRAMP's 2026 rules (launched 24 Jun 2026) are told that "Providers SHOULD remediate Known Exploited Vulnerabilities according to the due dates in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog (even if the vulnerability has been fully mitigated)".

Everyone else has no CISA deadline. The 3-day and 14-day figures are still a published benchmark for how fast a cataloged flaw on an exposed asset is expected to move, and an auditor or insurer may cite them.

## Worked case: GitLab, CVE-2026-97229

GitLab shipped the fix in its critical patch release of 12 Oct 2026 (19.4.2, 19.3.5 and 19.2.8) and rates the flaw 10.0. CISA's SSVC entry, stamped 13 Oct, lists automatable yes and technical impact total, so an exposed self-managed instance falls in row 1. CISA added the CVE to the catalog on 29 Oct 2026, 17 days after the patch, with a due date of 1 Nov 2026 (29 Oct plus 3 days). Take two agencies with the same exposed instance on 19.4.1.

Two assumed agencies applying BOD 26-04's clock rule to the real GitLab dates. The enumeration dates are invented for illustration; everything else is from GitLab, NVD and the KEV feed.

|  | Agency A | Agency B |
|---|---|---|
| Enumerates the instance and updates the CDM dashboard | 20 Oct 2026 | 30 Oct 2026 |
| Table 1 row on that day | Row 5: exposed, not yet in the KEV, automatable, total: 3 days | Row 1: 3 days & forensic triage |
| Clock started | 20 Oct 2026, the earlier event | 29 Oct 2026, the catalog addition |
| Date the 3 days end | 23 Oct 2026 | 1 Nov 2026 |
| Position when CISA adds the CVE on 29 Oct | Already 6 days past the date, and triage is now also required | Within the catalog due date, 2 days left |

Agency B must patch and also triage by 1 Nov 2026. GitLab states that 19.4.1 had an incomplete earlier fix, so the target is 19.4.2 or later. The patch itself is a restart of GitLab services after a backup. GitLab also warns that a successful exploit can be quiet, so a clean log does not prove safety, and its detections name the Workhorse log, the CI lint endpoint and the GraphQL ciLint mutation. CISA's implementation guidance puts the triage steps in order: scope, preserve volatile data, patch, contain, analyze, then a report. It gives target hours (scoping within two hours of the catalog addition, the report within 48 to 72 hours) as recommendations only; the requirement is that "an adequate forensic triage analysis is performed". Preserve evidence before patching: "Collect all required evidence prior to this step as patching may jeopardize the availability of artifacts."

## What to record

- CVE ID, asset, and the date and tool that first identified the CVE on it, so the clock start can be shown (the earlier of that date and the catalog addition).
- Table 1 inputs as answered for this asset: exposure with its evidence, catalog status, automatable and impact as CISA published them, and the row and number of days they give.
- The date the update was applied or the system was decommissioned, and the version reached.
- In a triage row: the forensic triage report and its date. CISA's guidance says it "will serve as an agency record" and should hold the incident timeline, the actions taken, technical findings, containment and a recommendation.
- If you mitigated first by taking the system off the internet: the date and the evidence. That changes the exposure value.

There is no review date here, only a due date. A mitigation is a step inside the clock, not a replacement for it.

## When the usual answer is wrong

- The catalog date is later than 3 days but your asset is exposed. The feed reflects CISA's evidence, not your inventory; the agency decides exposure asset by asset (Chromium V8 above).
- The patch exists but the first fix was incomplete. GitLab 19.4.1 is the case on this page: check the vendor's fixed-version list, not just that you applied an update.
- The patch is applied but the asset may already be compromised. In a triage row the patch alone does not meet the directive. Rows 2 and 4 carry no triage requirement, but exploitation before the patch is still possible for any cataloged flaw.
- The patch breaks something the mission needs. The deadline stays; go to [a patch that breaks a critical system](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/patch-breaks-critical-system/).
- The vendor has not shipped a patch for your version. Go to [no patch yet](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-no-patch-yet/).
- The asset is not exposed after all. The timeline lengthens: row 9 to 12 for an unexposed asset on the catalog, or [internal asset, not on the KEV](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/internal-asset-not-kev-moderate/) if the CVE is not listed.

The newest catalog entries carry a required action that names BOD 26-04 and ends with an exposure duty: "Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines." In the feed read on 19 Nov 2026 (catalog 2026.11.18), 169 of 1,786 entries carry it: 131 with a 3-day due date and 38 with 14 days. The wording of those actions, including the discontinue clause, is covered in [KEV required actions: mitigate or discontinue](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/kev-required-actions-mitigate-or-discontinue/).

## Sources

- CISA, BOD 26-04, definitions, Table 1 and Appendix A notes: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, forensic triage steps and FAQ on due dates and waivers: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA KEV JSON feed, catalog 2026.11.18, dateAdded, dueDate and requiredAction: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP 2026 rules, VDR-TFR-KEV: https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- GitLab, critical patch release 19.4.2, 19.3.5, 19.2.8 (vendor advisory): https://docs.gitlab.com/releases/patches/patch-release-gitlab-19-4-2-released/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NVD record for CVE-2026-97229, including CISA SSVC entry: https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-97229 (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

## Related

- [Decision Table: Remediate, Mitigate or Accept by Situation](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/index.md)
- [Exploited Flaw, No Patch Yet: Mitigate and Set Two Dates](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-no-patch-yet/index.md)
- [Internal Asset, Not on the KEV, Automatable: 60 Days](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/internal-asset-not-kev-moderate/index.md)
- [KEV Required Action: Mitigate or Discontinue Use](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/kev-required-actions-mitigate-or-discontinue/index.md)
