# How long a risk acceptance can last

Canonical: https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/maximum-durations/

FedRAMP's 192 days is a reporting trigger, not a permission: a finding still open 192 days after evaluation must be reported as accepted. BOD 26-02 has a 24-month step for end-of-support edge devices, PCI DSS Requirement 6.3.3 asks critical patches within one month, NIST sets no maximum and CISA allows no waivers. Read 19 Nov 2026.

## Nine sources and what each limits

A source that sets no number is listed because its silence matters to the expiry date.

The maximum duration each source sets, with its own wording; read 19 Nov 2026.

| Source | Limit | Wording |
|---|---|---|
| [FedRAMP 2026, VER-TFR-MAV](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-evaluation-and-reporting/) | A finding open 192 days after evaluation is reported as an accepted vulnerability. Rev5 providers must follow the rules from 7 Dec 2026 (initial and ongoing certification); the grace period ends 7 Mar 2027. | "Providers MUST categorize any vulnerability that is not or will not be fully mitigated or remediated within 192 days of evaluation as an accepted vulnerability." |
| [FedRAMP legacy playbook](https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/) | Critical and High 30 days, Moderate 90, Low 180, from discovery | "FedRAMP requires Critical and High risks to be remediated within 30 days of discovery, Moderate risks within 90 days of discovery, and Low risks within 180 days of discovery." |
| [CISA BOD 26-04, Table 1](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk) | 3, 14 or 60 calendar days, or "Fix on system upgrade", by exposure, KEV listing, automatability and technical impact | "Days are calendar days." Table 1 cells: "3 days & forensic triage", "3 days", "14 days", "60 days", "Fix on system upgrade". |
| [CISA BOD 26-04 implementation guidance](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk) | No waivers and no exceptions | "CISA does not issue waivers or exceptions for actions required in cyber directives." |
| [CISA BOD 26-02](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-02-mitigating-risk-end-support-edge-devices) | End-of-support edge devices: steps at 12, 18 and 24 months from issuance on 5 Feb 2026, so 5 Feb 2027, 5 Aug 2027 and 5 Feb 2028; does not apply to operational technology | "Within eighteen (18) months of issuance, all FCEB agencies shall: Decommission all identified EOS edge devices from agency networks" |
| [PCI SSC FAQ 1597](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597) and [FAQ 1046](https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1046) | PCI DSS Requirement 6.3.3: critical vulnerabilities one month from release; other patches on the entity's own risk-based time frames. Neither FAQ sets a duration for a compensating control; an assessor judges whether it meets the intent of the requirement. | "PCI DSS Requirement 6.3.3 specifies time frames for installing security patches/updates: those for critical vulnerabilities must be resolved within one month of release." |
| [NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-37r2.pdf) | No fixed maximum; the authorizing official sets the termination date and may drop it under ongoing authorization | "Organizations may eliminate the authorization termination date if the system is operating under an ongoing authorization" |
| [NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, SI-2](https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_2_0/home/SI-2) | No fixed number; the update window is organization-defined | "Organization-defined time periods for updating security-relevant software and firmware may vary based on a variety of risk factors" |
| [NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf) | No fixed number; exceptions are tracked and reviewed | "Organizations should closely track and monitor all exceptions to maintenance plans." |

## What 192 days does and does not mean

FedRAMP defines an accepted vulnerability as one "that the provider does not intend to fully mitigate or remediate, OR that has not or will not be fully mitigated or remediated within the maximum overdue period" ([FedRAMP definitions](https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/definitions/)). An overdue vulnerability is a separate term: one the provider does intend to fix but has not fixed in the recommended time. Accepted findings stay in the monthly report, because providers must report vulnerability activity "at least monthly" (VER-TFR-MHR). BOD 26-02's last step, at 24 months from 5 Feb 2026, is a different kind of limit: it applies to end-of-support edge devices as a whole, not to a single vulnerability.

The clock runs from evaluation, not from discovery as in the legacy playbook. For an evaluation finished on 21 Oct 2026, day 192 falls on 1 May 2027 (date arithmetic by this site); the [worked example](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/example/) uses that date. Before day 192 the rules set shorter "SHOULD" timeframes to partially mitigate, fully mitigate or remediate to a lower impact rating, which depend on the certification class, the impact rating (PAIN), whether the flaw is internet-reachable (IRV) and whether it is likely exploitable (LEV).

Timeframes from evaluation in FedRAMP VDR-TFR-PVR (Classes A and B share one table); read 19 Nov 2026. The tables list PAIN-2 to PAIN-5.

| Class | Impact rating | Likely exploitable and internet-reachable | Likely exploitable, not internet-reachable | Not likely exploitable |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A and B | PAIN-5 | 4 days | 8 days | 32 days |
| A and B | PAIN-4 | 8 days | 32 days | 64 days |
| A and B | PAIN-3 | 32 days | 64 days | 192 days |
| A and B | PAIN-2 | 96 days | 160 days | 192 days |
| C | PAIN-5 | 2 days | 4 days | 16 days |
| C | PAIN-4 | 4 days | 8 days | 64 days |
| C | PAIN-3 | 16 days | 32 days | 128 days |
| C | PAIN-2 | 48 days | 128 days | 192 days |
| D | PAIN-5 | 12 hours | 1 day | 8 days |
| D | PAIN-4 | 2 days | 8 days | 32 days |
| D | PAIN-3 | 8 days | 16 days | 64 days |
| D | PAIN-2 | 24 days | 96 days | 192 days |

## A mitigation and a KEV date

FedRAMP's KEV rule says providers should remediate known exploited vulnerabilities by the CISA due date "even if the vulnerability has been fully mitigated" (VDR-TFR-KEV). A control in front of a KEV item can lower the risk but does not count as the fix against that date. See the [Decision Table row for KEV items with a patch available](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/kev-patch-available-exposed/) and the [difference between remediation and mitigation](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/difference-between-remediation-and-mitigation/).

BOD 26-04 treats one kind of mitigation differently: "one valid mitigation is to remove the system from the internet; that action changes the value of 'Publicly Exposed' from Yes to No and will shift the required timeline". The shift depends on the other columns of Table 1, as the rows below show. The rows are read from CISA's Table 1; row numbers are CISA's.

Agency timeline for remediation in BOD 26-04 Table 1 before and after internet exposure is removed; read 19 Nov 2026.

| Facts of the finding | Publicly exposed | No longer exposed |
|---|---|---|
| On the KEV, automatable, partial control | 3 days (row 2) | 14 days (row 10) |
| On the KEV, automatable, total control | 3 days & forensic triage (row 1) | 3 days & forensic triage (row 9) |
| On the KEV, not automatable, partial control | 14 days (row 4) | 14 days (row 12) |
| Not on the KEV, automatable, partial control | 14 days (row 6) | 60 days (row 14) |

## Setting an expiry when no standard gives a number

No standard cited here sets a number for a non-federal organization, so the form asks for a date and the approver chooses it. The anchors are NIST's rule that the official sets the termination date and FedRAMP's 192-day line. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 supports a dated end for any stand-in: "Organizations should plan to replace emergency mitigations with permanent fixes" and "Schedules should be set and enforced for both patch deployment and mitigation removal" (Section 3.5.3).

The rule below is this site's method, not a standard's requirement. Tie the expiry to an event that exists, take the earlier of that event and the organization's own cap, and write down which one applied. The worked cases assume an invented policy that caps any acceptance at 90 days with one written renewal, and a decision on 19 Nov 2026.

Worked expiry choices under an invented 90-day policy; date arithmetic by this site.

| Case | Event the expiry is tied to | Expiry | What happens at expiry |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fix waits on a vendor who promises a release by 29 Jan 2027 | The vendor release date, earlier than the 90-day cap (17 Feb 2027) | 29 Jan 2027 | Install the fix, or renew with the vendor's new written date. See [risk exception expiry](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/exception-expiry-and-renewal/). |
| System is scheduled for decommission on 31 Mar 2027 | The cap binds, because the decommission date is later than the cap | 17 Feb 2027 | One renewal to 18 May 2027 (17 Feb plus 90 days) is allowed only if decommissioning is still on schedule. A date that keeps moving is the failure case; see the [decommission row](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/decision-table/decommission-scheduled/). |
| No fix date and no decommission date | Nothing but the cap | 17 Feb 2027 | The renewal decision must be replace, retire or accept again with new facts; a second acceptance without new facts is a silent extension. See [accepting risk on end-of-life software](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/accepting-risk-on-end-of-life-software/). |

Each expiry falls on or before the last milestone in field 9 of the [Risk Acceptance Form](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/), so the lapse forces a decision when new facts exist. For the FedRAMP requests that preceded the 192-day rule see [FedRAMP deviation requests](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/fedramp-deviation-requests/).

## Sources

- FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026, VER-TFR-MAV, VER-TFR-MHR and effective dates: https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-evaluation-and-reporting/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026, VDR-TFR-PVR and VDR-TFR-KEV: https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/providers/rev5/rules/vulnerability-detection-and-response/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP definitions: accepted vulnerability, overdue vulnerability: https://www.fedramp.gov/2026/definitions/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- FedRAMP legacy documentation, Plans of Action and Milestones, remediation requirements: https://www.fedramp.gov/legacy/playbook/csp/authorization/poam/ (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04, Appendix A and Table 1: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, waiver question: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-04-implementation-guidance-prioritizing-security-updates-based-risk (read 19 Nov 2026)
- CISA, BOD 26-02, Required Actions: https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/bod-26-02-mitigating-risk-end-support-edge-devices (read 19 Nov 2026)
- PCI SSC, FAQ 1597, resolving or addressing vulnerabilities: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1597 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- PCI SSC, FAQ 1046, approval of compensating controls: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/faqs/1046 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, Task R-4: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-37r2.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, SI-2 (OSCAL catalog): https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cprt/catalog#/cprt/framework/version/SP_800_53_5_2_0/home/SI-2 (read 19 Nov 2026)
- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Sections 3.5.3 and 3.5.5: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf (read 19 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 19 Nov 2026

## Related

- [Risk Acceptance Form: Free Template With 15 Fields](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/index.md)
- [Risk Acceptance Form Example: Filled-In Worked Sample](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/risk-acceptance-form/example/index.md)
- [Risk Exception Expiry: What Happens and How to Renew](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/exception-expiry-and-renewal/index.md)
- [FedRAMP Deviation Requests and Their 2026 Replacements](https://remediationvsmitigation.com/guides/fedramp-deviation-requests/index.md)
