Compensating controls in audit: what an auditor checks
An assessor decides whether a compensating control meets the intent of the requirement; PCI SSC says it cannot approve one itself (FAQ 1046). FAQ 1572, June 2025, adds that a missed periodic action cannot be repaired afterward, and lists four conditions for an In Place finding. Read 19 Nov 2026.
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Who decides
PCI SSC states: "QSAs are responsible to determine whether a compensating control is sufficient to meet the intent of a requirement during their review of all other controls in place to satisfy PCI DSS requirements." (FAQ 1046, April 2012). The Council "is not able to approve specific configurations or compensating controls" because it is not onsite. The evidence has to persuade one assessor looking at the whole environment, not match a form.
Under NIST SP 800-53 the decision to accept residual risk sits with the authorizing official. Control CA-6 describes authorizations as management decisions that "explicitly accept the risk to organizational operations and assets" based on "the implementation of agreed-upon controls", and says nonfederal organizations may have "similar processes". Whoever plays that role in your organization signs the exception behind the control.
What the control itself has to show
PCI SSC FAQ 1093 (June 2025) sends readers to Appendices B and C of PCI DSS v4.0.1 for compensating controls.
The assessor evaluates each control in every annual assessment, and processes must keep it effective after the assessment. Four PCI SSC FAQs then state what an assessor looks for in the record:
| FAQ | What it says | What to put in the record |
|---|---|---|
| 1093 (June 2025, mainframes and Requirement 3.5.1) | "Compensating controls must address the additional risk introduced by not meeting the original requirement." | The risk the missing requirement leaves, stated, and the control matched to it |
| 1466 (May 2019) | Document the approach and "demonstrate how the risk is mitigated and how the intent of the requirement is met"; recommendations are not to be viewed "in isolation" | The intent of the requirement in your words, and the effect of the change on neighboring settings |
| 1130 (June 2013) | For unsupported systems, controls "must protect the system from vulnerabilities that may lead to exploit"; log monitoring, allowlisting and isolation "alone would not provide sufficient mitigation"; it is "a temporary solution only" | A set of controls, a migration plan and its date |
| 1597 (May 2025) | "Addressed" means the entity "determines whether to resolve the vulnerability or to mitigate the risk by addressing the vulnerability in another way (e.g., with a compensating control or by disabling a vulnerable service)" | The risk level the entity assigned under 6.3.1 and the targeted risk analysis behind the timeframe |
A missed deadline cannot be repaired afterward
FAQ 1572 (June 2025) asks whether a compensating control can cover a requirement with a periodic frequency that was missed. It cannot: "there is no way for them to perform the control retroactively or backdate a later occurrence of the control to an earlier period." Its examples include a missed external ASV scan, "not installing a critical security patch within 30 days of release" and not reviewing network security control configurations every six months.
An assessor can still mark the requirement In Place if the entity has implemented corrective actions and performed the control as required, and the assessor has assurance of four things: a repeatable and documented process; that the activity was missed due to an exceptional circumstance ("poor security practices and recurring failures are not 'exceptional circumstances'"); that the cause was addressed; and that steps now prevent recurrence. Otherwise the assessor "can consider whether a 'Not in Place' finding would be the appropriate result".
A patch deadline worked with dates
The payment API below belongs to an invented entity. Dates are real, from the Node.js October 2026 security releases and the CISA KEV feed (2026.11.18). CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Brotli decoder bundled with Node.js, reachable when an application decompresses attacker-supplied data with node:zlib. Node.js fixed it in 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 on 21 Oct 2026, and says end-of-life lines are always affected by a security release. NVD lists as affected every Node.js version below 22.23.4, from 23.0.0 below 24.22.1, and from 25.0.0 below 26.12.1. FAQ 1597 says PCI DSS Requirement 6.3.3 requires patches for critical vulnerabilities to be "resolved within one month of release", and that the entity assigns the risk level under 6.3.1 rather than accepting an outside rating. FAQ 1572 words the same limit as "30 days of release". From 21 Oct, 30 days ends on 20 Nov and one month on 21 Nov, so the entity plans to 20 Nov, the earlier date.
| Date | Event | What the assessor can later see |
|---|---|---|
| 21 Oct 2026 | Node.js releases 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 for CVE-2026-111497 (CVSS 3.1 base score 9.8 in NVD) | Release date: the one-month clock starts |
| 27 Oct 2026 | CISA adds the CVE to KEV; the entity rates it critical under 6.3.1 and records why | The rating and its reason, dated |
| 10 Nov 2026 | KEV due date, 14 days after listing | Whether the entity treated it as an internal target |
| 20 Nov 2026 | 30 days from release (FAQ 1572's wording) ends here, the planning deadline under 6.3.3. One month under FAQ 1597 ends a day later, on 21 Nov | Patch evidence dated on or before 20 Nov meets both readings |
If the service is on 22.x, 24.x or 26.x and moved to the matching fixed build (22.23.4, 24.22.1 or 26.12.1) by 20 Nov, the patch record is the evidence and no compensating control is needed. If the patch lands on 24 Nov, FAQ 1572 applies: the 20 Nov deadline was missed, and a control put in place now cannot be backdated. The entity needs the four assurances above, and the packet below shows the corrective actions. If the service runs Node.js 20.x, an end-of-life line, the October releases do not cover it; that is the unsupported-software case in FAQ 1130, and the control must be in place before the deadline with a migration plan attached. The step-by-step version is in accepting risk on end-of-life software.
Federal justification text
FedRAMP's legacy playbook, reference only since 24 Jun 2026, set the bar for a risk adjustment: "To justify a RA, CSPs must describe mitigating factors or compensating controls in place that reduce likelihood and/or impact of exploitation." It also required that high-risk vendor dependencies be "mitigated to a Moderate level through compensating controls within thirty (30) days." The 2026 rules replace that scheme with a 192-day limit: a vulnerability not fully mitigated or remediated within 192 days of evaluation is categorized as accepted (VER-TFR-MAV). A compensating control buys time on a clock that ends, which is the subject of maximum duration of a risk acceptance.
Evidence packet checklist
Compensating control evidence packet (one per finding)
- Finding: identifier, asset, date found.
- Requirement or timeline that cannot be met as written, with the clause number and the date it fell due.
- Why it cannot be met (vendor patch not available, outage window, end of life) and the risk the gap leaves.
- The intent of the requirement, in your words.
- Control used, from the compensating controls register, and what it changes.
- What the control does not fix, stated in the entry.
- Verification: test record with date and tester; configuration or rule export with date.
- Evidence the control continues: monitoring, drift alert, review dates.
- Approver (name and role) and date of approval.
- End date or review date, the migration or fix plan, and the action that closes the finding.
- If a periodic action was missed: the four FAQ 1572 assurances, each with its document.
- Link to the dated exception in the exception register.
The packet below filled in for the Node.js 20.x service from the case above. The entity, finding number, dates after 21 Oct 2026 and the migration date are invented to show the layout; the vulnerability, the fixed lines and the stopgap are real.
| Item | Entry for the Node.js 20.x payment API |
|---|---|
| 1 Finding | F-2041, payment API, CVE-2026-111497, found 27 Oct 2026 when CISA added it to KEV |
| 2 Requirement | 6.3.3, critical patch within one month of release (21 Oct 2026), so due 20 Nov 2026 on the planning date used above |
| 3 Why it cannot be met | Node.js 20.x is end of life and the October releases cover only 22.x, 24.x and 26.x; the gap is that the Brotli decoder in the service stays unpatched |
| 4 Intent | Keep attacker-supplied compressed data from reaching the vulnerable decoder |
| 5 Control | Gateway rule rejecting inbound requests with Content-Encoding br, the stopgap described by Aikido and ELLIO; it changes likelihood on request bodies only |
| 6 Not fixed | Brotli responses the service fetches from other servers; the service still runs the vulnerable code |
| 7 Verification | Dated test by a person other than the rule author: a request with Content-Encoding br to the production path is refused; gateway rule export saved |
| 8 Continues | Weekly count of rejected requests; rule export compared at each monthly review; alert if the rule is disabled |
| 9 Approver | Head of Payments Engineering, approved 12 Nov 2026 |
| 10 End date | Move to 22.23.4 by 15 Jan 2027, then remove the rule; plan in the POA&M |
| 11 Missed periodic action or deadline | Not a FAQ 1572 case while the control is approved (12 Nov) before the 20 Nov date. If 20 Nov passes with the patch not installed, 6.3.3 rests on the control alone: FAQ 1597 says a critical flaw is "resolved" when fixed, which a gateway rule is not, so the assessor decides under FAQ 1046 whether the control meets the intent |
| 12 Exception | EX-2041 in the exception register, expiring 15 Jan 2027 |
The 15 Jan 2027 end date in item 10 is 56 days after the 20 Nov date in item 2, so the control stands in for the patch for that whole period. FAQ 1130 words the limit for unsupported systems: the controls are "a temporary solution only", which is why item 10 carries the migration date and the exception expires on it. The system owner assembles the packet, with the owner of the control supplying items 5 to 8 and the approver in item 9 signing; the assessor reviews it and does not write it. Items 7 and 8 are the two NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 checks: the control is "functioning as intended" and the risk response "continues to be in place", which means no one "deactivates the additional security controls". A reviewer can only repeat those checks if the record names exactly what to repeat. For item 7, write the test so a second person can run it and get the same result: the path, the input, the expected rejection and where it is logged. For item 8, attach dated output from the monitoring (for example, a count of rejected requests per week) and the rule export taken at each review, so a sample of dates can be compared with the original setting. The compensating controls register holds the control entries, how to verify a mitigation the test, and the POA&M guide the plan that tracks the fix.
Sources
- PCI SSC FAQ 1046 (April 2012), approval of compensating controls, read 19 Nov 2026
- PCI SSC FAQ 1093 (June 2025), mainframes storing cardholder data (Requirement 3.5.1); the compensating-control sentence refers to "this or any other requirement" and points to PCI DSS Appendices B and C, read 19 Nov 2026
- PCI SSC FAQ 1130 (June 2013), unsupported operating systems, read 19 Nov 2026
- PCI SSC FAQ 1466 (May 2019), alternative password methods as compensating controls, read 19 Nov 2026
- PCI SSC FAQ 1572 (June 2025), compensating controls and missed periodic requirements, read 19 Nov 2026
- PCI SSC FAQ 1597 (May 2025), assigning risk levels, resolving or addressing vulnerabilities, read 19 Nov 2026
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0, control CA-6 (NIST OSCAL catalog), read 19 Nov 2026
- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Guide to Enterprise Patch Management Planning, Section 2.2, read 19 Nov 2026
- FedRAMP legacy playbook, POA&M, General POA&M Guidance, read 19 Nov 2026
- FedRAMP 2026 Vulnerability Evaluation and Reporting, VER-TFR-MAV, read 19 Nov 2026
- Node.js, October 2026 security releases, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA, KEV JSON feed, catalogVersion 2026.11.18, read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD record for CVE-2026-111497 (affected Node.js ranges, CVSS 3.1 base score), read 19 Nov 2026
- Aikido analysis of CVE-2026-111497, read 19 Nov 2026
- ELLIO analysis of CVE-2026-111497, read 19 Nov 2026
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