Risk acceptance criteria

Seven tests decide whether a finding may be accepted instead of fixed: tolerance, a signer with authority, verified controls, a dated plan, written residual risk, no bar from a directive or contract, and an expiry date. On 14 Oct 2026 a PAN-OS flaw fails four of the seven for a federal agency and three for anyone else; a Linux kernel flaw passes all seven.

  1. Remediate
  2. Mitigate now, fix later
  3. Accept with a dated exceptionThis page is about it

The seven tests

No NIST publication gives one list of acceptance criteria. These seven are assembled from the clauses that each govern one condition. A finding that fails any one of them is fixed, mitigated or avoided instead.

Seven tests for a risk acceptance, each with its source; texts read 19 Nov 2026.
TestPass conditionSource
1. Tolerance or compelling needThe risk is within stated tolerance, or a named mission or business need justifies moreSP 800-39, Task 3-1
2. AuthorityThe signer holds the authority the policy gives; for US federal systems, the authorizing official, undelegatedSP 800-37 Rev. 2, Task R-4
3. Verified controlsEach control is described, owned and checked, and the record shows it "continues to be in place"SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Section 2.2
4. Dated planTasks, resources, milestones and "scheduled completion dates"SP 800-37 Rev. 2, Task A-6
5. Residual risk writtenThe risk left after the response is stated and compared with toleranceSP 800-37 Rev. 2, Task R-3
6. Nothing bars itNo directive, standard or contract term forbids acceptanceBOD 26-04 guidance, PCI SSC FAQ 1046
7. ExpiryA termination date set by the approverSP 800-37 Rev. 2, Task R-4

Test 1 depends on a limit that NIST declines to set: "There is no correct level of organizational risk tolerance" (SP 800-39). The organization has to write it down before the first acceptance is signed; risk acceptance vs risk tolerance covers how. Test 7 borrows from authorization: in SP 800-37 the termination date "is established by the authorizing official and indicates when the authorization expires."

Two findings run through the tests

CVE-2026-0322 is a code injection flaw in the PAN-OS management interface. Palo Alto Networks published fixed builds on 14 Oct 2026, states that no workaround exists, rates exploit maturity as attacked and reports very limited exploitation (advisory). CISA added it to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog the same day with a due date of 17 Oct 2026 (KEV feed). CVE-2026-80521 is a use-after-free in the Linux kernel's AF_UNIX garbage collector that a local, low-privilege user can reach. The 6.1 stable fix shipped in Linux 6.1.189 on 3 Oct 2026 (changelog), and the CVE was not in the catalog in version 2026.11.18 (NVD record). The host used for the second CVE is invented: a Linux 6.1 log-collector server, lc-02, with three named administrator accounts and no other local users. The same CVE is filled in on all 15 fields, for a different setting (six gateway appliances whose vendor has shipped no fixed kernel), in the worked Risk Acceptance Form.

Both findings run through all seven tests. The CVE facts are from the cited advisories and the catalog read on 19 Nov 2026; the log collector, the policy and the signer on the right are invented.
TestCVE-2026-0322, PAN-OS firewallCVE-2026-80521, Linux 6.1 log collector
1. ToleranceFails. Root code execution, active exploitation and a fix on day one. No stated tolerance covers thatPasses. Local access and a won race are needed; only three administrators can log in; the policy tolerates Moderate for 30 days on internal servers
2. AuthorityPasses. The policy names the signerPasses. The security head signs under the same policy
3. Verified controlsFails. Palo Alto says restricting management access to one jump box lowers its CVSS 4.0 rating only from 8.6 to 8.5, so the control does not bring the risk down to tolerancePasses. SSH is limited to the three accounts; the account list and the key list were read on 19 Nov 2026
4. Dated planPasses. A plan can be dated: upgrade to the fixed build for the train, such as 11.2.16 or 10.2.18-h12Passes. Install 6.1.189 or later in the window of 12 Dec 2026
5. Residual riskFails. With the jump box in place the vendor still rates the flaw 8.5 (High), above any Moderate tolerancePasses. Low: an attacker would first need one of the three accounts
6. Nothing bars itFederal civilian agency: fails. CISA "does not issue waivers or exceptions for actions required in cyber directives" and the due date was 17 Oct 2026 (guidance). Any other organization: passes, unless a contract or PCI DSS requirement appliesPasses; no directive, contract term or PCI DSS requirement applies
7. ExpiryPasses in form; any expiry date can be written, which is why this test cannot rescue a finding that failed earlier ones18 Dec 2026, 29 days after signing on 19 Nov 2026, six days after the window
OutcomePatch. A federal agency fails tests 1, 3, 5 and 6; any other organization fails tests 1, 3 and 5. Either way acceptance is not available. A short mitigation is allowed only while the build is staged, and it is recorded as mitigationAccept until 18 Dec 2026, with a reopen trigger if the CVE reaches the catalog

The right-hand column passes because every cell can be checked by someone other than the signer. The record for it holds: ID EXC-2026-044 (invented); CVE-2026-80521 on lc-02; reason (fix 6.1.189 exists, install waits for the 12 Dec window); controls (SSH limited to three accounts, verified 19 Nov 2026; key list read the same day); plan (install 6.1.189 or later on 12 Dec 2026); residual risk Low; signer the security head, signed 19 Nov 2026; expiry 18 Dec 2026; reopen if the CVE reaches the KEV catalog or a fourth account is added. If the account list could not be produced, test 3 would fail and the finding would go back for mitigation. The left-hand column fails whether or not a directive applies: a finding that fails tests 1, 3 and 5 is not a candidate for the Risk Acceptance Form, whatever the cost of patching.

Where acceptance is not available at all

Some findings fail test 6 before anyone weighs risk. A federal civilian agency facing a catalog action gets no waiver (the Decision Table row for a missed KEV due date sets out the steps). BOD 26-04 also counts removal as a fix: the vulnerability "shall be remediated (that is, the vulnerability is eliminated through patching, decommissioning the system, or another action)" (BOD 26-04). The choice in that setting is between ways of fixing, not between fixing and accepting.

In PCI DSS the entity does not approve its own substitute. PCI SSC states it is "not able to approve specific configurations or compensating controls," and points to a Qualified Security Assessor to evaluate whether a compensating control meets the intent of the requirement (FAQ 1046). The PCI row of the Decision Table shows the route.

Residual risk after the response (test 5) is covered in residual risk after mitigation. The owner who proposes the acceptance is a different role from the signer in test 2; see who is the risk owner.

Sources

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