Plan of action and milestones (POA&M)

A plan of action and milestones entry is required when a mitigation cannot be completed immediately (NIST SP 800-53 RA-7), and it holds tasks, resources, milestones and scheduled completion dates (SP 800-37 Task A-6). The filled entry tracks CVE-2026-19868, on CISA's KEV catalog since 6 Nov 2026 with a 20 Nov due date, fixed in SonicOS 7.3.4-7013.

  1. RemediateCovered here
  2. Mitigate now, fix laterCovered here
  3. Accept with a dated exceptionCovered here

When a finding gets an entry

NIST SP 800-53 CA-5 asks the organization to "Develop a plan of action and milestones for the system to document the planned remediation actions of the organization to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted during the assessment of the controls and to reduce or eliminate known vulnerabilities in the system". Its guidance adds that the plans "are required in authorization packages and subject to federal reporting requirements established by OMB". PM-4 notes that "While plans of action and milestones are required for federal organizations, other types of organizations can help reduce risk by documenting and tracking planned remediations."

Quotations from NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0, SP 800-37 Rev. 2 and FedRAMP's 2026 agency page, read 19 Nov 2026.
SituationEntry?Where the finding lives insteadText
Fixed or mitigated the same dayNoThe ticket and the closed findingRA-7: the mitigation may be done "immediately so that a plan of action and milestones entry is not needed"
Mitigation cannot be completed immediatelyYesThe planRA-7: "a plan of action and milestones entry is generated"
Interim control in place, fix waits on the vendor or a change windowYesThe plan, with the exception record if the gap is acceptedCA-5: planned remediation of weaknesses
Authorizing official accepts the deficiency as residual riskNot necessaryThe assessment report and the exception recordSP 800-37 Task A-6: entries "are not necessary when deficiencies are accepted by the authorizing official as residual risk"
Provider-reported vulnerability and the agency has nothing to doNoThe provider's own vulnerability recordsFedRAMP 2026: "Agencies should not copy every provider-reported vulnerability into an agency POA&M."

The exception register holds the accepted rows and the plan holds the rows waiting for a fix, which is why the two documents are kept apart in the risk register comparison.

The fields of an entry

SP 800-37 Task A-6 names what the plan holds: "tasks to be accomplished with a recommendation for completion before or after system authorization; resources required to accomplish the tasks; milestones established to meet the tasks; and the scheduled completion dates for the milestones and tasks". The system owner or common control provider has primary responsibility for the task. The FedRAMP POA&M template adds columns for the CVE and the KEV due date. The table says which field comes from which text.

Fields of a plan of action and milestones entry and the text behind each, read 19 Nov 2026. Rows without a quoted basis are this site's practice, not a requirement.
FieldWhat goes inBasis
Entry ID and CVEOne ID per finding and asset group; every CVE it coversFedRAMP template column AD, "CVE", added 27 Jun 2022
Weakness and source of detectionThe flaw in plain words, the scanner or feed that found it, the finding IDFedRAMP legacy playbook: Column F, Weakness Detector Source
AssetName, version, environment, exposure (public or internal)BOD 26-04 asset tags: environment and exposure
OwnerA role that answers for the entry and one owner per milestoneSP 800-37 Task A-6, primary responsibility: system owner
Resources requiredChange window length, people, money, vendor supportSP 800-37 Task A-6
Authority dateThe KEV due date, when one existsFedRAMP template column AC, named for BOD 22-01, which BOD 26-04 revoked on 10 Jun 2026
MilestonesEach task with a date, an owner and the record that proves itSP 800-37 Task A-6: scheduled completion dates
Scheduled completion dateThe date the finding is expected to read as closedSP 800-37 Task A-6
Milestone changesEvery change with the date and the reasonKeeps the original dates readable
Vendor dependencyYes or no, the product, the last vendor check-in dateFedRAMP legacy columns Q, R and S: check in "at least once a month"
Status and status dateOpen, in progress or closed, and when that was last trueSP 800-37: the plan "is subsequently used to monitor progress"
Exception linkThe exception ID, if the gap between mitigation and fix is acceptedThis site's field, see the Risk Acceptance Form

A filled entry for CVE-2026-19868

The finding is real. CISA added CVE-2026-19868 (SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN, "Use of Single-factor Authentication Vulnerability", CWE-308) to the KEV catalog on 6 Nov 2026 with a due date of 20 Nov 2026 and the required action "Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions". NVD describes it as a flaw that "may allow a user with valid credentials for an alternate authentication method to bypass SAML authentication controls". SonicWall advisory SNWLID-2026-0014 lists SonicOS Gen7 7.3.3-7015 and older and Gen8 8.2.2-8015 and older as affected, and names the fixed builds: Gen7 7.3.4-7013 and higher, Gen8 8.2.3-8015 and higher. (NVD's configuration data uses slightly different cut-offs, so the entry uses SonicWall's figures.) The flaw matters only where SAML is enabled for SSLVPN logins and at least one LDAP, RADIUS or TACACS+ server is active. The advisory was released on 5 Nov 2026 (version 1.0); version 1.1, dated 9 Nov 2026, updated the workaround: with SAML in use and no upgrade possible, disable or delete every active LDAP, RADIUS and TACACS+ server on the firewall. The cost is that anything on the firewall that signs in through those servers stops working until they are re-enabled. The firewall names, owners and every date after 19 Nov below are the example's own.

POA&M entry POAM-2026-0114 (example)

Weakness: SonicOS SSLVPN accepts a user's valid credentials for an alternate authentication method in place of SAML authentication, which can bypass SAML-enforced MFA. CVE-2026-19868, CWE-308.
Source of detection: CISA KEV catalog (version 2026.11.18) matched to the asset inventory on 19 Nov 2026; vendor advisory SNWLID-2026-0014.
Original detection date: 6 Nov 2026 (the day CISA added the CVE; BOD 26-04 starts the clock at KEV addition or the agency's own identification, whichever is first).
Asset: fw-edge-a and fw-edge-b, SonicOS Gen7 (NSa 4700) build 7.3.3-7015, SAML SSLVPN in use, LDAP and RADIUS servers active, production, publicly exposed.
KEV due date: 20 Nov 2026. Forensic triage flag in the feed: No.
Entry owner: Network operations lead. Reviewer: Security operations lead.
Resources required: one 2-hour change window, two engineers, the 7.3.4-7013 firmware image, vendor support contact.
Vendor dependency: No. The fixed build exists: SonicOS 7.3.4-7013 or higher for Gen7.

#DateMilestoneOwnerRecord that proves it
119 Nov 2026Confirm the build and that SAML SSLVPN is enabled on both units; list the active LDAP and RADIUS servers and every login that depends on them (admin sign-ins included) and move those to local accounts firstNetwork operations leadConfiguration export and dependency list attached to the ticket
220 Nov 2026 (KEV due date)Apply SonicWall's workaround from SNWLID-2026-0014 version 1.1 on both units: disable or delete every active LDAP, RADIUS and TACACS+ server; a second person checks the server listsNetwork operations lead; Security analystChange record and the checked server lists
320 Nov 2026Compare SSLVPN login records since 6 Nov 2026 with the identity provider's sign-in log for logins that went through an alternate methodSecurity operations analystSaved log search and a one-line result
45 Dec 2026, 02:00 to 04:00Upgrade both units to SonicOS 7.3.4-7013 or higherNetwork operations leadChange ticket and the version shown after the change
57 Dec 2026Confirm 7.3.4-7013 or higher on both units, rescan, re-enable the LDAP and RADIUS servers, closeSecurity analystScan ID, version output and close note

Scheduled completion date: 7 Dec 2026.
Milestone changes: none (each change is logged with date and reason).
Status on 19 Nov 2026: Open, in progress, milestone 1 under way.
Exception link: none. If milestone 4 slips past 5 Dec 2026, open an exception record and enter its ID here.

The date arithmetic is short. The KEV due date is 14 days after the 6 Nov addition. The upgrade in milestone 4 falls 29 days after the addition and 15 days after the due date, so for a federal asset the 5 Dec upgrade by itself misses the KEV date. Milestone 2 is what the entry relies on for 20 Nov: the required action is to apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, and SonicWall's workaround is the vendor's instruction for a firewall that cannot be upgraded yet. An agency confirms that reading with the directive's contact before it depends on it. Milestone 5 closes the entry 31 days after the addition. The entry stores the KEV date and does not move it. Which timeline in BOD 26-04 Table 1 applies to an asset depends on exposure, KEV status, automatability and technical impact, so confirm that row before accepting a 5 Dec upgrade date. Milestone 2 is checked by a second person because a mitigation has to be verified, not assumed.

Cases where one entry per finding is wrong

  • Assets with different exposure. BOD 26-04 applies its timeline "For each asset detected to contain an instance of a CVE ID", and a mitigation that removes an asset from the internet "will shift the required timeline". Two assets with one CVE and different exposure need separate milestone dates.
  • Accepted risk. With an acceptance signed by the authorizing official, SP 800-37 says no entry is necessary. The deficiency stays in the assessment report and the exception record carries it.
  • Legacy FedRAMP combined risks. The playbook (reference only since 24 Jun 2026) let assessors combine risks from unauthorized external services into one line of the risk exposure table, but providers "must create unique POA&M items" because "remediation plans and mitigating factors will likely differ for each service".
  • Vendor dependencies. The legacy playbook keeps them as open risks, asks for "evidence of vendor interactions" and requires High-risk vendor dependencies to be mitigated to Moderate within thirty days. See FedRAMP deviation requests.
  • Cloud provider findings. FedRAMP's 2026 agency page limits agency entries to cases such as when "The agency needs to track a compensating control, contract action, monitoring activity, or other agency-owned response". For a service you cannot patch, see SaaS you cannot patch.
  • Operational technology. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 says to "take into account planned schedule maintenance or shutdowns of the OT system", so milestone dates follow outage windows, as in the OT and medical row.

Sources

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