Medical and OT devices that cannot follow the patch cycle
Mitigate with a pre-approved set of long-term methods and re-evaluate them on a schedule; accept the residual risk in a dated exception. Siemens advisory SSA-724261, published 10 Nov 2026 for CVE-2026-109830, says "Currently no fix is available", and CISA's republication on 17 Nov 2026 lists exposure and impact-analysis steps instead.
On this page
The situation and the decision
The device is a controller, gateway, infusion pump, imaging system or similar asset whose maker sets the update schedule, because each release needs testing or certification first, or because the maker has issued no fix. The decision is to isolate and restrict the device with methods reviewed in advance, to record the residual risk as a dated exception, and to patch when the maker releases a fix that the site can test and approve.
| Condition | Response | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maker has no fix yet | Long-term methods now; re-evaluate when the maker revises the advisory | NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, 3.5.4 |
| Maker has a fix but certification or testing delays it | Same methods; get the maker's release date in writing and set the exception to end then | 800-40 Rev. 4, 2.1 |
| Site could patch on its own, but only by voiding the warranty or support | Treat as unpatchable unless the maker agrees | 800-40 Rev. 4, 2.1 |
| Product is end of life and will never be fixed | Replace on a dated plan; isolate meanwhile | End-of-life software |
The rules it follows
NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Section 2.1 gives the reason and its price: "The manufacturer may require customers to update the software on a delayed schedule, such as for assets with human safety implications in a highly regulated sector, because of the extensive testing and certification that must be performed first. In these cases, organizations that choose to implement updates on their own may be voiding the product warranty and preventing future support from the manufacturer."
Section 3.5.4 turns it into a plan: "There should be an approved set of methods for each maintenance group, and these methods should have been reviewed and analyzed in advance by security architects/engineers to determine their adequacy in mitigating risk." It cites micro-segmentation and software-defined perimeters from SP 800-207 as examples, and asks for extra mitigations "to prevent exploitation of specific vulnerabilities that the long-term risk mitigation methods don't adequately address". Section 3.4 adds that such assets belong in their own maintenance group rather than being labeled exceptions, and Section 3.5.5 asks that "All exceptions to maintenance plans should be reviewed regularly to determine if the maintenance plan can be implemented now."
For medical devices the duty to produce patches sits with the maker. Under 21 U.S.C. 360n-2 (section 524B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act), the sponsor of a submission for a cyber device must "make available postmarket updates and patches to the device and related systems to address (A) on a reasonably justified regular cycle, known unacceptable vulnerabilities; and (B) as soon as possible out of cycle, critical vulnerabilities that could cause uncontrolled risks". A hospital waiting on a maker can therefore ask which of those two the flaw falls under and get a date.
A worked case: SSA-724261 and CVE-2026-109830
Siemens ProductCERT published SSA-724261 on 10 Nov 2026 (status interim, revision 1). It covers meta-iot2050, the Siemens meta-iot2050 project, from V01.03.01 with no upper version: "Affected devices take parts from a configuration file and execute them unchecked." An attacker able to change that file can run commands as root. The CVSS 3.1 base score is 7.3 (vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R) and the weakness is CWE-78. The remediation field reads "Currently no fix is available". CISA republished the advisory verbatim as ICSA-26-321-11 on 17 Nov 2026. NVD lists the record as awaiting analysis, and the CVE is not in KEV catalog 2026.11.18.
CISA's recommended practices are the pattern the row follows:
- "Minimize network exposure for all control system devices and/or systems, ensuring they are not accessible from the internet."
- "Locate control system networks and remote devices behind firewalls and isolating them from business networks."
- "When remote access is required, use more secure methods, such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), recognizing VPNs may have vulnerabilities and should be updated to the most current version available. Also recognize VPN is only as secure as the connected devices."
- "CISA reminds organizations to perform proper impact analysis and risk assessment prior to deploying defensive measures."
The last line matters on a plant floor or a ward: the mitigation itself can stop a process. CISA also says the text is republished "as-is" and that it is "not responsible for the editorial or technical accuracy of republished advisories", so Siemens' own advisory settles the affected versions.
The flaw needs local access and a user action, so the exposure that matters is who can write the configuration file: engineering laptops, update tooling and remote-support paths. A site with these devices on an isolated cell network and file changes limited to a controlled engineering station already has most of what the advisory asks for.
| Date | Event | Action on the record |
|---|---|---|
| 10 Nov 2026 | Siemens publishes SSA-724261; NVD publishes CVE-2026-109830 | Inventory units at V01.03.01 or later; open the entry |
| 17 Nov 2026 | CISA republishes as ICSA-26-321-11 | Confirm the republication adds no new instruction |
| 19 Nov 2026 | KEV catalog 2026.11.18 holds no entry; advisory still shows no fix | Entry stays open; mitigation list approved |
| On revision of SSA-724261 | A fix or new mitigation appears | Re-run the risk and cost-benefit steps below |
A worked case for a medical device: the request to the maker
The device is a networked infusion pump. The hospital's biomedical team learns on 2 Nov 2026 (assumed) that a vulnerability affects the pump firmware and that no update is yet released. The maker cannot be forced to a date, but 21 U.S.C. 360n-2 lets the hospital ask a pointed question. If the pump is a cyber device under the section's definition, its sponsor must "submit to the Secretary a plan to monitor, identify, and address, as appropriate, in a reasonable time, postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits" and make updates available either on a "reasonably justified regular cycle" for known unacceptable vulnerabilities or "as soon as possible out of cycle" for critical vulnerabilities "that could cause uncontrolled risks". The section took effect 90 days after 29 Dec 2022, so it covers submissions made after 29 Mar 2023; for an older pump, ask what the maker commits to.
| Date | Step | Result on the record |
|---|---|---|
| 2 Nov 2026 | Hospital learns of the flaw; asset list shows 140 pumps on firmware below the fixed release | Entry opened; pumps moved to their own maintenance group |
| 3 Nov 2026 | Pump VLAN limited to the infusion server and the biomedical engineering station; internet and general hospital access removed. Biomedical engineering checks pump delivery at the clinical test bench | Long-term methods applied; impact analysis signed by clinical engineering |
| 4 Nov 2026 | Written request to the maker: is this a known unacceptable vulnerability (regular cycle) or a critical one (out of cycle), and what is the release date of the update | Request and send date kept |
| 18 Nov 2026 | Maker answers: regular cycle, firmware release 15 Jan 2027 | Answer filed; 14 days after the request |
| 29 Jan 2027 | Exception end: release date plus 14 days for bench testing, before any pump is updated | Exception ends 88 days after 2 Nov 2026 |
| Each maker notice | Maker revises the advisory or answers another request | Re-run risk and cost-benefit steps |
The exception is signed by the risk owner for the clinical service the pumps support, with clinical engineering's impact analysis and the security architect's review of the segmentation attached. NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4 names the architect's review but no signer, so the title is this site's rule. If the maker later calls the flaw critical, the out-of-cycle duty applies and the end date moves up.
Re-evaluation has two parts
The one NIST sentence behind the review date: "Organizations should plan on periodically reevaluating their alternatives to patching." The two parts, from the same section, are a risk assessment of whether the alternatives are still effective and a cost-benefit analysis of whether the assets are worth the added cost of "mitigating, transferring, or accepting the risk of unpatchable assets". No interval is given. As this site's own rule, re-evaluate at every revision of the maker's advisory and at every new flaw in the asset, since Section 3.3 notes that "a new vulnerability in an asset might necessitate a change in the methods needed to mitigate its risk", and put a calendar date on the entry as a backstop. How to prove a control still works is in verifying the mitigation works.
What to record
- Device, maker, firmware version, the maker's update schedule and the reason it blocks patching.
- The maintenance group and its approved long-term methods, the architect's review date and the last test date. Network segmentation is the usual first method.
- The impact analysis done before each defensive measure, and who signed it off.
- The next re-evaluation date and its owner. Residual risk goes in a dated exception, signed by the risk owner for the process the device supports (the authorizing official on a federal system), with the architect's review attached.
When the usual answer is wrong
- The device is reachable from the internet. Remove that first; no other method makes up for it, and a VPN is only as secure as the devices behind it.
- The mitigation breaks the process. Test it on a spare or in a maintenance window before it goes on a live line, as CISA's impact-analysis line says.
- The maker has shipped a certified fix. The exception has run out of reason; schedule the update.
- The flaw is already in the KEV. A federal KEV due date still binds a federal agency: BOD 26-04 allows no waiver, and if the update cannot be applied by the date, CISA's fallback is to remove the asset from the network. For a device that cannot leave the network, contact CISA about the special case. Elsewhere, isolation is a stopgap and the maker's fix date decides how long the exception can run. The risk owner signs it, with the authorizing official on a federal system.
- Nobody has asked the maker for dates. A note of the request and the reply belongs on the record, and under 21 U.S.C. 360n-2 it is a fair request for a medical device.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Sections 2.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5.4, 3.5.5, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA, ICS advisory ICSA-26-321-11, Recommended Practices and revision history, read 19 Nov 2026
- Siemens ProductCERT, SSA-724261 (CSAF), affected range and remediation, read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD record for CVE-2026-109830, read 19 Nov 2026
- 21 U.S.C. 360n-2, Ensuring cybersecurity of devices (FD&C Act section 524B), read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA KEV feed, catalog version 2026.11.18, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, waiver and alternative mitigation FAQs, read 19 Nov 2026
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