End of life software risk acceptance
Accept end-of-life software only for a stated period, with isolation or paid support in place and a trigger that reopens the record. NIST SP 800-53 SA-22 asks for "documented approvals (including justification)". In CISA's feed read on 19 Nov 2026, 83 of 1,786 required actions use end-of-life wording.
On this page
Where the decision row stops and this guide starts
The end-of-life row of the decision table gives the answer (replace, remove, or isolate) and the federal decommissioning dates. This guide covers the case where replacement is blocked and a signed exception is needed: what NIST allows, the steps and records, one case worked with dates, and what CISA's feed shows.
What SA-22 allows
SA-22 gives two options. The organization must "Replace system components when support for the components is no longer available from the developer, vendor, or manufacturer", or "Provide the following options for alternative sources for continued support for unsupported components". Its guidance names the two cases where replacement may wait: "systems that provide critical mission or business capabilities where newer technologies are not available or where the systems are so isolated that installing replacement components is not an option." Alternative support can be "customized patches for critical software components" built in-house or "external providers who provide ongoing support" under contract.
The added risk "can be mitigated, for example, by prohibiting the connection of such components to public or uncontrolled networks, or implementing other forms of isolation." The assessment objects to examine include "documented approvals (including justification) for the continued use of unsupported system components". An exception is therefore a record of three things: why replacement is blocked, who provides support or what isolates the component, and who approved. The PCI SSC says the same about unsupported operating systems in its FAQ 1130 (June 2013): compensating controls "must protect the system from vulnerabilities that may lead to exploit of the unsupported code", and "should be considered a temporary solution only" with "an active migration plan". It names three controls that may be combined: active monitoring of system logs and network traffic, application allowlisting, and isolating the system, and adds that "these examples alone would not provide sufficient mitigation."
Six steps, who does them and what they leave
| Step | Who | Record left | How it usually fails |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Confirm the end-of-support date from the vendor's own lifecycle page | Product owner | Product, version, vendor date, page address and date read | The date is copied from a scanner label, which can be wrong or late |
| 2. Write why replacement is blocked and what it needs | System owner | Reason, replacement project, cost and target date | "No budget" is written with no date, so the exception has no end |
| 3. Choose the route: paid support, in-house patches, or isolation | Security lead | Route, the controls, how each was verified | Isolation is claimed in a diagram and never tested |
| 4. Set the end date and the reopen triggers | Risk owner | Expiry date and trigger list on the risk acceptance form | The expiry equals "when the project finishes", with no date |
| 5. Check the KEV catalog and vendor advisories each month | Vulnerability management | Date of each check and the catalog version read | Checks name the product but not its bundled components |
| 6. Close, renew or escalate on the expiry date | Approver | New signature, or closure with the decommission record | Renewals repeat the same text with a new date and no new evidence |
A worked case: Node.js 20.x, 30 Apr to 10 Nov 2026
The organization and its exception are invented. The end-of-life date, the CVE and the KEV dates are real. An internal service decompresses data with Node.js 20.x, which the Node.js release schedule ends on 30 Apr 2026. A supported Node.js line exists, so neither SA-22 ground holds and the exception below is out of policy, as the end-of-life row says of this service. The case shows what the reopen triggers do to such an exception; use SA-22 only where replacement is truly blocked.
| Date | Event | Record |
|---|---|---|
| 30 Apr 2026 | Node.js 20 reaches end of life (Node.js Release schedule, "end": 30 Apr 2026) | Step 1 date confirmed |
| 12 May 2026 | Exception signed, 12 days after end of life. Route: isolation from the internet plus allowlisted callers. Expiry 30 Sep 2026, 141 days later. Reopen triggers: any KEV listing for Node.js, or any Node.js advisory naming 20.x | Form with expiry and triggers |
| 28 Sep 2026 | Renewal due since 31 Aug. The isolation is retested on 25 Sep, and the approver signs a new exception 2 days before the old one expires on 30 Sep. The old row is closed "renewed as" the new one. New expiry 31 Dec 2026, same triggers | Retest record, new form, old row closed |
| 21 Oct 2026 | Node.js ships 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 for CVE-2026-111497. The advisory says "End-of-Life versions are always affected when a security release occurs." Node.js 20.x gets no fix | Trigger 2 fires: the renewed exception is reopened |
| 27 Oct 2026 | CISA adds CVE-2026-111497 to KEV (CVSS 3.1 base score 9.8) with a due date of 10 Nov 2026, 14 days later | Trigger 1 fires |
| Before 10 Nov 2026 | Options recorded: move the service to Node.js 22.23.4 (the real fix), or as a stopgap reject inbound requests with Content-Encoding br at the reverse proxy, which the researchers at Aikido and ELLIO suggest and which does not cover Brotli responses the service fetches from others | Decision with the stopgap's cost written beside it |
The case shows why the end date needs a trigger and not only a calendar. The renewed exception ran to 31 Dec, yet a vendor release on 21 Oct made 20.x vulnerable with no fix possible, and 6 days later CISA's catalog set a 14-day clock. Had nobody signed by 30 Sep, the row would have moved to lapsed in the exception register and gone to the escalation owner, and the service would have been out of policy from 1 Oct. Isolation from the internet is not enough on its own: the flaw needs attacker-influenced compressed input, which an internal caller or an upstream response can also supply. Because no patch can exist for an end-of-life line, the only closing evidence is the move to a supported line and a version check after it.
What federal policy adds
CISA's BOD 26-02 quotes OMB Circular A-130: "unsupported information systems and system components are phased out as rapidly as possible, and planning and budgeting activities for all IT systems and services incorporate migration planning and resourcing to accomplish this requirement." Its dated steps cover edge devices only, and the directive "does not apply to Operational Technology" (the dates are in the end-of-life row). For OT, NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 says "many legacy systems may contain hardware and software that are no longer supported by vendors and cannot be patched or updated to protect against new vulnerabilities", and asks for "a complete and convincing rationale for how the selected compensating controls provide an equivalent security capability or level of protection". The OT row is OT and medical devices that cannot be patched.
What the KEV feed shows about end-of-life products
Counted by script on 19 Nov 2026 from the CISA KEV JSON feed, catalogVersion 2026.11.18: 83 of 1,786 required actions contain the words end-of-life (any case, with or without hyphens). They cover 19 vendor names, 36 product names and 37 vendor and product pairs; 17 are marked as used in ransomware campaigns. Of the 83 texts, 52 read "The impacted product is end-of-life and should be disconnected if still in use." Four others hedge: "The impacted product could be end-of-life (EoL) and/or end-of-service (EoS)."
| Year added to KEV | Entries with end-of-life wording |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 1 |
| 2022 | 54 |
| 2023 | 4 |
| 2024 | 18 |
| 2025 | 6 |
| 2026 | 0 |
| Vendor in the feed | Entries | Products named |
|---|---|---|
| Adobe | 36 | Acrobat and Reader, Flash Player; Flash Player; Flash Player and AIR |
| Checkbox | 1 | Checkbox Survey |
| D-Link | 14 | DCS-930L Devices; DIR-300 Router; DIR-600 Router; DIR-605 Router; DIR-610 Devices; DIR-645 Router; DIR-820 Router; DIR-820L; DNS-320 Storage Device; Multiple NAS Devices; Multiple Routers |
| D-Link and TRENDnet | 1 | Multiple Devices |
| Dasan | 2 | Gigabit Passive Optical Network (GPON) Routers |
| Delta Electronics | 1 | DOPSoft 2 |
| IBM | 1 | InfoSphere BigInsights |
| Ivanti | 4 | Cloud Services Appliance; Cloud Services Appliance (CSA) |
| Kaseya | 1 | Virtual System/Server Administrator (VSA) |
| Linux | 2 | Kernel |
| Microsoft | 8 | Internet Explorer; SharePoint; Silverlight |
| NETGEAR | 2 | DGN2200 Devices; Multiple Devices |
| NUUO | 2 | NVRmini Devices; NVRmini2 Devices |
| Reolink | 2 | Multiple IP Cameras; RLC-410W IP Camera |
| Ruckus Wireless | 1 | Multiple Products |
| Schneider Electric | 1 | U.motion Builder |
| SonicWall | 1 | Secure Remote Access (SRA) |
| Sophos | 1 | CyberoamOS |
| Zyxel | 2 | DSL CPE Devices |
Repeat listings arrive in clusters. Ivanti Cloud Services Appliance 4.6.x was added on 13 Sep 2024 (CVE-2024-8190), 19 Sep 2024 (CVE-2024-8963) and twice on 9 Oct 2024 (CVE-2024-9379 and CVE-2024-9380): four entries in 26 days. Its required action said "future vulnerabilities on the 4.6.x version of CSA are unlikely to receive security updates." An acceptance that rests on the product never having been attacked has no support in this data; the trigger in step 4 should be a listing for the product or for the vendor line.
Limits to write into the exception
- An end date tied to the replacement or decommission date (decommission scheduled).
- The isolation in place and the test that confirmed it, with its date.
- A trigger that reopens the record: a KEV listing for the product, or a vendor release that names the end-of-life line.
- For federal edge devices in scope of BOD 26-02, no exception path is stated; CISA's BOD 26-04 implementation guidance says CISA "does not issue waivers or exceptions for actions required in cyber directives".
Sources
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0, control SA-22 (NIST OSCAL catalog), read 19 Nov 2026
- PCI SSC FAQ 1130, unsupported operating systems (June 2013), read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA, BOD 26-02, read 19 Nov 2026
- NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, legacy systems and compensating controls, read 19 Nov 2026
- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Section 3.5.5, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA, KEV JSON feed, catalogVersion 2026.11.18, read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA, BOD 26-04 implementation guidance, read 19 Nov 2026
- Node.js Release working group, schedule.json (v20 end 30 Apr 2026), read 19 Nov 2026
- Node.js, October 2026 security releases, read 19 Nov 2026
- NVD, CVE-2026-111497, read 19 Nov 2026
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