Risk acceptance form example
A worked sample fills all 15 fields of the Risk Acceptance Form for a real flaw, CVE-2026-80521 in the Linux kernel, on six invented appliances whose vendor has shipped no fixed kernel. The approver signs on 19 Nov 2026 and the exception expires 17 Feb 2027, 90 days later.
On this page
The finding behind the sample
CVE-2026-80521 is a race in the Linux kernel's AF_UNIX garbage collector that can corrupt kernel memory. It needs local code execution (CVSS 3.1 vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:L, base 7.8) and is not in the CISA KEV catalog, version 2026.11.18 (NVD, CISA KEV feed). The fix went into Linux 7.2, and stable releases carry it from 7.1.10, 6.18.53, 6.12.111, 6.6.158 and 6.1.189. The last 7.0 release on kernel.org, 7.0.14, lacks it (ChangeLog-7.0.14; ChangeLog-7.1.10 has it), and kernel.org's release list on 19 Nov 2026 names no 7.0 branch among the maintained kernels (kernel.org releases). Red Hat states that a mitigation "is either not available or the currently available options do not meet" its criteria (Red Hat).
That makes it the situation the Decision Table calls a fix that waits on a vendor: an appliance vendor must rebase its firmware onto a maintained kernel, and until it does the choice is between a compensating control and a dated acceptance. The sample takes both: two controls and a 90-day acceptance. Everything about the organization is invented, including the vendor's message.
The completed form
- Risk Acceptance Form (.docx)
- Risk Acceptance Form (PDF)
- Blank exception register (CSV)
- Form fields (CSV)
- Form fields (JSON)
Risk Acceptance Form: WORKED SAMPLE (invented organization, real CVE)
Sample record. The organization, systems, people, IDs and vendor messages are invented. CVE-2026-80521 and the kernel facts about it are real.
A. The finding
Field 1. Exception ID: SAMPLE-EXC-0001
CVE ID(s) and scanner finding ID(s) covered: CVE-2026-80521; inventory finding SAMPLE-F-4417
Field 2. First detected: 14 Oct 2026, 09:20 UTC, by the weekly firmware inventory match (sample): appliance firmware 4.2 reports kernel 7.0.x
Evaluation completed: 21 Oct 2026, 16:30 UTC
B. Where it sits and how likely it is to be used
Field 3. Asset(s): six gateway appliances, gw-01 to gw-06 (sample names). Environment: prod. Exposure: internal.
Field 4. Internet-reachable? No. Basis: the flaw needs code already running on the appliance; the appliances run no service that accepts user-supplied code; architecture drawing dated 10 Nov 2026 shows no route from the internet to their management or shell access.
Field 5. Likely exploitable? Not on current facts. The CVSS 3.1 vector is AV:L/AC:L/PR:L (base 7.8): the attacker must already run code as a local user and win a narrow race. On the CISA KEV catalog? No. Catalog version checked: 2026.11.18.
Field 6. Estimated impact if exploited, on the sample organization's three-level scale: Moderate (root on a gateway exposes internal routing configuration; no customer data is stored on it).
C. The decision
Field 7. Why accepted: the appliance vendor controls the firmware and ships kernel 7.0.x. The kernel project's fix is in 7.2 and in the 7.1.10, 6.18.53, 6.12.111, 6.6.158 and 6.1.189 stable releases, and no 7.0.x release contains it, so the fix can only arrive as a firmware rebase by the vendor. The vendor's email of 12 Nov 2026 (sample) says firmware 4.3 with a fixed kernel is planned for the first quarter of 2027. Replacing six gateways before then would interrupt site-to-site traffic. Policy SAMPLE-POL-3 allows Moderate residual risk on an internal service for up to 90 days.
Field 8. Controls in place:
- Local shell and code-execution rights on the appliances limited to three named administrator accounts; all other local accounts disabled. Owner: Platform lead. Verified 18 Nov 2026 by listing accounts on all six units. Register entry: access-restriction, SAMPLE-CC-12.
- Alert on any new local account or new shell session on an appliance. Owner: Security operations lead. Verified 18 Nov 2026 by a test alert on gw-03. Register entry: increased-monitoring, SAMPLE-CC-31.
- Neither control is a vendor instruction: Red Hat states a mitigation is "either not available or the currently available options do not meet" its criteria, and no vendor lists a workaround.
Field 9. Plan:
- Task 1: install firmware 4.3 on all six units when released. Owner: Platform lead. Needs: a 2-hour change window per unit. Milestone: within 14 days of release.
- Task 2: if the vendor has not shipped by 15 Feb 2027, decide between replacing the appliances and a renewed acceptance. Owner: Application owner. Date: 15 Feb 2027.
Field 10. Reopen when: the vendor ships a kernel containing the fix; CVE-2026-80521 appears on the KEV catalog; any appliance gains a route from outside the internal network or a feature that runs user-supplied code; either control fails its check. Review every 30 days. Next review: 18 Dec 2026.
Field 11. Residual risk: Low to Moderate while both controls hold; inside the Moderate tolerance stated in policy SAMPLE-POL-3.
Field 12. Vendor dependency: product: gateway firmware 4.2 (sample). Vendor status evidence: vendor email of 12 Nov 2026 giving the planned quarter. Last check-in: 12 Nov 2026. Next check-in: 14 Dec 2026 (one month after 12 Nov is 12 Dec 2026, so the next working day).
D. Decision and expiry
Field 13. Approver: Chief Information Security Officer. Name: (the person holding the role; the sample names a role so as not to invent a person). Signed 19 Nov 2026.
"I accept the residual risk in Field 11 until the date in Field 14."
Field 14. Expiry: 17 Feb 2027 (90 days from the decision). Lapses unless renewed in writing.
E. Only if PCI DSS applies
Field 15. Not applicable in this sample.
Prepared by: Platform lead (sample role). Reviewed by: Security lead (sample role).
The dates, worked out
| Date | How it is derived | Where it appears |
|---|---|---|
| 14 Oct 2026 | First detection (sample) | Field 2 |
| 21 Oct 2026 | Evaluation finished (sample) | Field 2 |
| 12 Nov 2026 | Vendor email and last check-in (sample) | Field 12 |
| 19 Nov 2026 | Decision and signature (sample) | Field 13 |
| 14 Dec 2026 | Next vendor check-in: one month after the last is 12 Dec 2026, so the next working day, Monday | Field 12 |
| 18 Dec 2026 | First 30-day review, set one day inside the 30 days | Field 10 |
| 15 Feb 2027 | Task 2 decision date, two days before expiry | Field 9 |
| 17 Feb 2027 | Decision date plus 90 days, chosen by the approver | Field 14 |
| 1 May 2027 | Evaluation date plus 192 days, the point at which FedRAMP's 2026 rule requires an unfixed finding to be categorized as accepted; shown for comparison, not on the form | Not on the form |
Choices that make the sample record hold up
The approver field names a role and says why: NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2 states "The explicit acceptance of risk is the responsibility of the authorizing official and cannot be delegated to other officials within the organization" (Task R-4). That sentence covers federal systems. For other organizations SP 800-37 names no title, so the policy must say who signs; the who may sign page sets out the options. A real record carries the person's name.
Both controls carry an owner, a verification method and a date, which answers SP 800-40 Rev. 4: "Make sure that the risk response continues to be in place" (Section 2.2, step 3d). The vendor field is filled because the fix depends on one, and the legacy FedRAMP playbook asks for "evidence of vendor interactions regarding the status of patches/fixes" (playbook), which is why field 12 cites the vendor's email. The expiry falls inside the vendor's planned quarter, so the lapse arrives when the vendor's status is known.
Four ways a record like this fails
- No expiry date. Field 14 left blank turns a dated decision into permanent acceptance; maximum durations shows what each source allows.
- Controls named but not checked. "Access limited" with no owner and no verification date does not meet SP 800-40 Rev. 4 Section 2.2, step 3d.
- Signed by the requester. NIST SP 800-37 and the FedRAMP rules do not address it, so the policy must say that the person who asked for the exception does not sign it.
- Residual risk missing. SP 800-37 Task R-3 says "there remains a degree of residual risk" whatever the response; a record that omits it has not been compared with tolerance.
What happens on 18 Dec 2026
The first review has three outcomes. The record stays as signed, the exception closes because the vendor shipped a kernel with the fix and the rescan no longer detects the flaw, or the case escalates because a trigger in field 10 fired. Each outcome becomes a row change in the exception register. Risk exception expiry covers what the signer does on the expiry date, and residual risk after mitigation covers how the figure in field 11 is formed.
Sources
- NVD, CVE-2026-80521 (description, CVSS 3.1 vector and base score), read 19 Nov 2026
- CISA KEV catalog JSON feed, catalogVersion 2026.11.18 (no entry for CVE-2026-80521), read 19 Nov 2026
- Red Hat Security Data API, CVE-2026-80521 (mitigation statement), read 19 Nov 2026
- kernel.org, ChangeLog-7.0.14 (no fix commit) and ChangeLog-7.1.10 (fix commit present), read 19 Nov 2026
- kernel.org, list of current releases, read 19 Nov 2026
- NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2, Tasks R-3 and R-4, read 19 Nov 2026
- NIST SP 800-40 Rev. 4, Section 2.2 step 3d, read 19 Nov 2026
- FedRAMP legacy documentation, Plans of Action and Milestones, POA&M Do's and Don'ts, read 19 Nov 2026
- FedRAMP Consolidated Rules for 2026, VER-TFR-MAV, read 19 Nov 2026
Last reviewed