Application allow-listing as a compensating control

No Microsoft advisory or CISA text read on 19 Nov 2026 names application allow-listing as a mitigation for any CVE in this site's data. Its use against CVE-2026-68820 (fixed 11 Aug 2026) is an inference from that flaw's precondition: it helps only when the exploit must start a program the policy has not approved.

What this control does toward each outcome

  1. RemediateLeaves the flaw: Does not stop exploitation of an approved program or in-memory abuse of it. The list must be kept current or it fails open or breaks work.
  2. Mitigate now, fix laterLowers exposure: Only approved programs can run on the host, so an exploit that drops or launches an unapproved program is blocked.Guidance points here
  3. Accept with a dated exceptionIf the fix date slips: accept the residual risk in a signed, dated, reviewed exception.Also allowed

Decision Table row: A control already sits in front of the vulnerable component (WAF rule, segmentation, access restriction). Group: What can run on the host.

Evidence to keep: Policy export with mode; Pilot test record; Allow-list review record.

What the control is

Microsoft describes application control as a change of default: Windows goes "from a place where all code runs unless your AV solution confidently predicts it's bad, to one where code runs only if your policy says so" (Microsoft Learn, App Control for Business). It adds that application control is not a replacement for antivirus. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0 enhancement CM-7(5), Authorized Software, allow-by-exception, has three parts (read 19 Nov 2026):

NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5.2.0, CM-7(5), OSCAL catalog, read 19 Nov 2026.
PartWhat it asksText
aName the authorized software"Identify" the programs, with an organization-defined scope. NIST's discussion says the list can be limited "to specific versions or from a specific source".
bDeny by default"Employ a deny-all, permit-by-exception policy to allow the execution of authorized software programs on the system;"
cKeep the list current"Review and update the list of authorized software programs" on an organization-defined schedule.

Unlike a WAF rule or an IPS signature, it does not depend on recognizing the attack. It limits what an attacker can start afterward.

When it counts as a mitigation and when it does not

The test is where the attacker's code runs. If the exploit needs a new program to start, a deny-by-default policy can refuse it. If the flaw is reached from inside a program that is already approved, nothing new starts and the policy sees nothing to block.

Preconditions from the CVE records read 19 Nov 2026.
FlawWhere the attacker's code runsDoes allow-listing help?
CVE-2026-68820, Windows afd.sys use-after-free (Microsoft, 11 Aug 2026)A locally authorized attacker runs a crafted applicationYes, if enforced on the host and the attacker has no approved program that runs arbitrary code.
CVE-2026-85880, Windows ALPC heap overflow (Microsoft, 8 Sep 2026)Code already running in a low-privilege AppContainer, such as a compromised browser rendererNo. The code is inside an approved process.
CVE-2026-87491, Chromium V8 out-of-bounds write (Google, 8 Sep 2026)Inside the browser sandbox, from a crafted pageNo. The browser is approved and runs the page.
CVE-2026-65660, SharePoint Server code injection (KEV 25 Sep 2026)The server application, from a network request by a low-privilege accountNo. The vulnerable program is approved and is meant to run.

CVE-2026-68820: an inference, not a published mitigation

No vendor or CISA entry names application allow-listing as a mitigation: not in the advisories for the four CVEs above, and not in the required actions of the 1,786 entries of the KEV feed of 18 Nov 2026. The use below is this site's inference from the preconditions of CVE-2026-68820, not Microsoft's or CISA's text. Microsoft published the fix on 11 Aug 2026 and marked the flaw exploited that day. CISA added it to KEV the same day with a due date of 25 Aug 2026, a 14-day window, and listed forensic triage as not required. Microsoft lists no workaround.

The inference rests on one fact. Microsoft's record says the flaw "allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally" and that "A locally authenticated attacker could run a specially crafted application on an affected system to trigger a race condition". On a host that enforces a deny-by-default policy, that application is not approved. A host where the policy only logs, or where the attacker can use an approved program that runs arbitrary code (next section), gets nothing. The fix is the August 2026 cumulative update for the Windows version in use:

Microsoft MSRC CVRF, August 2026 release, CVE-2026-68820, read 19 Nov 2026. Server Core installations take the same update. Where two updates are listed they are the two August 2026 packages Microsoft maps to the same product. Windows Server 2025 and Windows 11 24H2 share the 26100 base but are serviced by different packages with different revisions, as the CVRF shows, so match a host's full build string to the row for its own product.
Windows versionUpdateFixed build
Windows Server 2012KB51203866.2.9200.26280
Windows Server 2012 R2KB51203856.3.9600.23338
Windows 10 1607, Server 2016KB512041810.0.14393.9418
Windows 10 1809, Server 2019KB512023810.0.17763.9121
Windows 10 21H2KB512024910.0.19044.7663
Windows 10 22H2KB512024910.0.19045.7663
Windows Server 2022KB5120242 or KB512022910.0.20348.5499 or 10.0.20348.5440
Windows 11 23H2KB512024010.0.22631.7517
Windows 11 24H2KB5121003 or KB512099410.0.26100.9168 or 10.0.26100.9106
Windows 11 25H2KB5121003 or KB512099410.0.26200.9168 or 10.0.26200.9106
Windows 11 26H1KB512100010.0.28000.2704
Windows Server 2025KB5120233 or KB512022810.0.26100.33296 or 10.0.26100.33222

Constructed example, not taken from a record: 12 servers carry the finding, 9 with the policy enforced and 3 audit-only. The dates:

  • 11 Aug 2026: Microsoft publishes the fix and CISA adds the flaw to KEV. This is the finding date. The KEV due date is 25 Aug 2026.
  • 12 Aug: the endpoint team reads the policy mode on all 12 servers and finds 3 audit-only and 9 enforced.
  • 13 Aug: the security tester runs the unapproved test program on a pilot server and sees event 3077. The endpoint team lists which of Microsoft's bypass files the policy allows: none on 7 of the enforced servers, msbuild.exe on 2.
  • 14 Aug: the 3 audit-only servers are patched, 11 days inside the window. They need no exception.
  • 22 Aug: the 7 enforced servers with no allowed bypass file are patched in the weekly window, 3 days before the due date.
  • 29 Aug: the 2 enforced servers that allow msbuild.exe are patched after a change freeze, 4 days after the due date. Their exception runs from 11 Aug to 29 Aug, which covers the 14-day window and the 4 days after the due date, and says the control does not cover msbuild.exe. For a federal agency, BOD 26-04 would not count the control as moving the date.

Approved programs that can run arbitrary code

A deny-by-default policy fails for this flaw if the attacker can start the crafted code through a program the policy already allows. Microsoft states the risk: "Microsoft has identified a list of valid applications that an attacker could also potentially use to bypass App Control." Unless the use case requires them, it recommends blocking these (the list names files; check each against the host's allow rules) (Microsoft Learn, applications that can bypass App Control):

File names from Microsoft Learn, read 19 Nov 2026. Microsoft notes: allow msbuild.exe only on a development reference system; if the WebDAV DLLs are blocked, also disable the WebClient service.
GroupFiles on Microsoft's list
Script hosts and shellscscript.exe, wscript.exe, mshta.exe, bash.exe, wmic.exe
Build and compile toolsmsbuild.exe, msbuild.dll, Microsoft.Build.dll, aspnet_compiler.exe, Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe, csi.exe, rcsi.exe, fsi.exe, fsiAnyCpu.exe, dotnet.exe, dnx.exe, texttransform.exe
Debuggerscdb.exe, kd.exe, ntkd.exe, ntsd.exe, windbg.exe, dbghost.exe, dbgsvc.exe, dbgsrv.exe
Windows Subsystem for Linuxwsl.exe, wslconfig.exe, wslhost.exe, lxrun.exe, lxssmanager.dll
Otheraddinprocess.exe, addinprocess32.exe, addinutil.exe, bginfo.exe (before 4.22), infdefaultinstall.exe, kill.exe, powershellcustomhost.exe, runscripthelper.exe, visualuiaverifynative.exe, wfc.exe, system.management.automation.dll, webclnt.dll and davsvc.dll

For each in-scope host, list which of these files the active policy allows. Any allowed entry means the host's row in the record is a dated exception, not a closure.

Reading enforced or audit mode on a host

Microsoft Learn, select types of rules to create, understanding App Control event IDs, and using Event Viewer with AppLocker, read 19 Nov 2026. App Control events for MSI and scripts are in the AppLocker, MSI and Script log.
ProductWhere the mode showsAudit mode (nothing blocked)Enforced (blocks)
App Control for BusinessPolicy rule option 3, Enabled:Audit Mode. Microsoft: "When the Enabled:Audit Mode is deleted, the policy runs in enforced mode."Event 3076 in Applications and Services Logs, Microsoft, Windows, CodeIntegrity, Operational: the file would have been blocked if the policy was enforcedEvent 3077 in the same log: the file did not pass the policy and was blocked
AppLockerEnforcement mode of each rule collection: Audit only or Enforce rulesEvent 8003 (EXE and DLL) or 8006 (scripts and MSI), level Warning: allowed to run but would have been prevented if enforcedEvent 8004 (EXE and DLL) or 8007 (scripts and MSI), level Error: prevented from running

A host whose log shows only 3076 or 8003/8006 events is audit-only and counts as unmitigated in the record below, however many programs it lists as blocked.

What it costs

Every program change touches the list. A server that changes software often needs the list updated each time, or it blocks work (list too narrow) or admits too much (list too broad). The managed installer option cuts this cost where a deployment tool exists: an AppLocker rule collection names the trusted installer binaries, such as Microsoft Configuration Manager or Intune, and with the policy option Enabled:Managed Installer set, files those binaries write are allowed unless a deny rule covers them (Microsoft Learn, managed installer). Windows trusts that origin only on the Windows OS volume, so apps installed on another volume need explicit rules. NIST sets no review interval for the list: CM-7(5) part c leaves the schedule to the organization. CM-7(5) part c exists for the list that is built once and never reviewed. That upkeep is the price to weigh against the fix. See the decision table row for a patch that breaks a critical system.

Check that it took

  1. Endpoint security team: read the policy mode on each in-scope host, as in the table above. A policy that logs what it would block protects nothing, so only hosts that log 3077 or 8004/8007 blocks and no audit-only option count.
  2. Security tester: on a pilot host your team owns, run a harmless unapproved test program and confirm the block event (3077 or 8004/8007). Stop at the block event.
  3. Asset owner: compare the count of enforced hosts with the inventory of affected hosts. Hosts outside the policy are unmitigated.
  4. Change manager: confirm who approves a new program for the list and how long that takes.
  5. List owner: review the list on the schedule set under CM-7(5)(c).

Record to keep

Application allow-listing record

  • Finding: [CVE], [product], [date published]; fixed build [build]
  • Basis: inference from the CVE precondition, no vendor or CISA text names this control
  • Why allow-listing applies: exploit needs [a new program to run] on [host group]
  • Why it may not: [files from Microsoft's bypass list that the policy allows, if any]
  • Policy and product: [name, version]; mode on each host: enforced or audit-only
  • Hosts in scope: [number]; enforced: [number]; audit-only: [number]
  • Patch date per host group: [group], [date]
  • Due date: [date]; days between due date and patch date: [number]
  • Pilot test: [date], [host], unapproved test program blocked: [yes or no]
  • Approval route for new programs: [owner], [turnaround]
  • List owner: [name]; last review [date]; next review [date]
  • End date: [date of fix install]; fix owner [name]
  • Approver: [name], [date]

Sources

Last reviewed